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THE FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF TREASON 
AND THE ENEMY COMBATANT PROBLEM 
CARLTON F.W. LARSON†
This Article argues that the issue of enemy combatant detentions should be 
studied through the lens of the Treason Clause of Article III.  Specifically, the 
Article argues that the Treason Clause prohibits the exercise of military author-
ity over individuals who are subject to the law of treason, a category that in-
cludes not only United States citizens, but almost all persons merely present 
within the United States.  From at least the seventeenth century through the 
nineteenth century, English and American treatise writers, public officials, and 
courts consistently distinguished between persons subject to the law of treason, 
and thus entitled to trial under the ordinary processes of the criminal courts, 
and persons who could be treated as enemies under military authority.  This 
long-standing rule was abandoned without coherent explanation by the Su-
preme Court in the 1942 decision of Ex parte Quirin, a decision unfortu-
nately affirmed in 2004 by Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.  This Article argues for rein-
statement of the traditional rule. 
The Article also argues that many terrorist actions are appropriately pun-
ished as treason, either as acts of levying war against the United States or of 
adhering to their enemies.  Rather than representing a fundamental departure 
from the ordinary criminal law paradigm, terrorist actions fit comfortably 
within it. 
INTRODUCTION 
For the past four years, legal experts have been debating constitu-
tional issues surrounding the Bush Administration’s so-called “war on 
terror.”  Although the details often vary greatly, two broad positions 
have emerged, which, for lack of better terms, can be labeled the “lib-
eral” and the “conservative” positions.  The “liberal” position roughly 
holds that the “war on terror” is not a true war in any meaningful in-
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ternational law sense; that only nations, not shadowy private organiza-
tions such as Al Qaeda, can ever be at “war” with the United States; 
that terrorism is best viewed as a large-scale problem of ordinary 
criminality; and that the detention of terrorist suspects as “enemy 
combatants” cannot be justified outside the context of a true war.1  
The “conservative” position, by contrast, contends that the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, were genuine acts of war; that full-scale 
military response is appropriate; that terrorists are the soldiers of a 
large, well-disciplined enemy that will stop at nothing to destroy the 
United States and our way of life; and that such persons may be held 
indefinitely as enemy combatants or subjected to trial by military tri-
bunals.2
1 See, e.g., Wayne McCormack, Military Detention and the Judiciary:  Al Qaeda, the KKK 
and Supra-State Law, 5 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 7, 71 (2004) (“Until the international 
community defines terrorist crimes as being violations of the ‘law of war,’ the U.S. sys-
tem should commit that these persons be tried in civilian courts rather than by military 
commissions . . . because there is no coherent distinction between the alleged terrorist 
and the ordinary street criminal.”); Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies 
Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of 
Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1342 
(2004) (“[A]ny conflict between the United States and al Qaeda as such cannot 
amount to war or trigger application of the laws of war.”); Kenneth Roth, The Law of 
War in the War on Terror, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 2, 7 (“War rules should be 
used in [cases away from the traditional battlefield] only when no law-enforcement sys-
tem exists, . . . not when the rule of law happens to produce inconvenient results.”); 
Stacie D. Gorman, Comment, In the Wake of Tragedy:  The Citizens Cry Out for War, But 
Can the United States Legally Declare War on Terrorism?, 21 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 669, 
674-78 (2003) (contending that the United States cannot legally declare war on terror-
ists); Nickolas A. Kacprowski, Note, Stacking the Deck Against Suspected Terrorists:  The 
Dwindling Procedural Limits on the Government’s Power To Indefinitely Detain United States 
Citizens as Enemy Combatants, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651, 669-75 (2003) (noting with 
alarm the then-current court decisions affirming the authority of the President to des-
ignate captured terrorists as enemy combatants). 
2 See, e.g., Thomas L. Hemingway, In Defense of Military Commissions, 35 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2004) (“In short, [the conflict with Al Qaeda] is a real, not a metaphorical, 
war.  The criminal paradigm . . . is thus inapplicable.”); Derek Jinks, September 11 and 
the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 38 (2003) (“[T]he September 11 attacks consti-
tuted the initiation of an ‘armed conflict’ within the meaning of . . . the Geneva Con-
ventions.”); John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 207, 
211 (2003) (“As a matter of domestic law, the President’s finding [that the September 
11 attacks placed the United States in a state of armed conflict] settles the question 
whether the United States is at war.”); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1683-84 (2002) (rejecting the contention that the use of military 
force requires congressional approval on the grounds that such an approach is too in-
flexible and unwieldy to effectively counter threats to national security).  For an argu-
ment that binary distinctions between war and peace are no longer tenable, see Rosa 
Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere:  Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed 
Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 725-29 (2004). 
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Whatever the merits of these conflicting positions under modern 
international law doctrine, they are both unsatisfying as a matter of 
basic constitutional law.  Both positions overlook a critical portion of 
the Constitution, a provision that has much to teach us about the en-
emy combatant problem and about issues related to terrorism gener-
ally.  This provision is the Treason Clause of Article III: 
 Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War 
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and 
Comfort.  No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testi-
mony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in Open 
Court. 
 The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Trea-
son, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or For-
feiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.
3
The Treason Clause, by its very terms, complicates both the liberal 
and conservative positions.  First, contrary to the liberal view that only 
nations may engage in war against the United States, the Treason 
Clause explicitly states that individuals are capable of engaging in war-
like actions—i.e., “levying war”—against it.  Second, contrary to the 
conservative view that persons who engage in such warlike actions 
against the United States are subject to military authority, the Treason 
Clause again states exactly the opposite:  persons who levy war against 
the United States are entitled to specific procedural protections, and 
they must be prosecuted in an Article III court with the prosecution 
bearing the burden of proof of an overt act by at least two witnesses. 
The Treason Clause is one of the great forgotten clauses of the 
Constitution, and many well-trained lawyers might be surprised to 
learn that it even exists.  Law school courses in constitutional law and 
criminal law ignore the subject entirely.  As George Fletcher lamented 
over twenty years ago, “[t]he basic criminal law course focuses on 
homicide, sometimes on rape and burglary, but no one discusses trea-
son.”4  Despite occasional flurries of public interest in the subject, in-
cluding the furor over the capture of John Walker Lindh in Afghani-
stan,5 legal scholarship on issues relating to treason is basically 
3 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
4 George P. Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41 MD. L. REV. 193, 194 (1982). 
5 Although many Americans clamored for a treason charge against Lindh, see, e.g., 
Henry Mark Holzer, Why Not Call It Treason?:  From Korea to Afghanistan, 29 S.U. L. REV. 
181, 221-22 (2002) (stating that the government’s failure to indict Walker for treason 
was a “colossal mistake” because it failed to confront Walker “with the prospect of 
death, as a consequence of betraying [his] country and its people”), the Justice De-
partment instead charged Lindh with, inter alia, providing material support to a ter-
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moribund.  Apart from the seminal work of James Willard Hurst many 
decades ago,6 there is virtually no scholarship engaging doctrinal is-
sues in American treason law.7  No one, it appears, has accepted 
rorist organization, see Indictment at 10, United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 
(E.D. Va. 2002) (No. CR-02-37A).  For an argument that Lindh did not commit trea-
son, see Suzanne Kelly Babb, Note, Fear and Loathing in America:  Application of Treason 
Law in Times of National Crisis and the Case of John Walker Lindh, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1721 
(2003). 
6 JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES (1971) 
(collecting Professor Hurst’s various law review articles on the subject). 
7 There are several historical overviews.  See, e.g., Hayes McKinney, Treason Under 
the Constitution of the United States, 12 ILL. L. REV. 381, 381 (1918) (showing “the distinc-
tion between the sort of language which may be used without risk of legal punishment 
and that other sort which may bring one into the shadow of the gallows”); Thomas P. 
Slaughter, “The King of Crimes”:  Early American Treason Law, 1787-1860, in LAUNCHING 
THE “EXTENDED REPUBLIC”:  THE FEDERALIST ERA 54 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Al-
bert eds., 1996) (analyzing the English origins of American treason law); Richard Z. 
Steinhaus, Treason, A Brief History with Some Modern Applications, 22 BROOK. L. REV. 254 
(1956) (discussing the rare instances of treason prosecution in American history).  
There are several pieces commenting on particular trials, see, e.g., Eric L. Muller, Be-
trayal on Trial:  Japanese-American “Treason” in World War II, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1759 (2004) 
(revisiting the 1944 treason trial of three Japanese American sisters); William 
Rehnquist, Civil Liberty and the Civil War:  The Indianapolis Treason Trials, 72 IND. L.J. 
927 (1997) (examining Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)); Arthur Wakeling, 
The Trial of Leisler for High Treason, 23 GREEN BAG 287 (1911) (recounting the 1691 
treason trial of Jacob Leisler); Wiley M. Craft, Note, Comment on Treason Trial of One 
Possessing Dual Nationality, 5 S.C. L.Q. 75 (1952) (discussing Kawakita v. United States, 
343 U.S. 717 (1952)), on particular aspects of treason law, see, e.g., Jabez W. Loane, IV, 
Treason and Aiding the Enemy, 30 MIL. L. REV. 43 (1965) (exploring the parallel devel-
opment of the criminal offense of treason and the military offense of aiding the en-
emy); Charles Warren, What Is Giving Aid and Comfort to the Enemy?, 27 YALE L.J. 331 
(1918) (reviewing the acts that may constitute treason by “giving aid and comfort”); 
James G. Wilson, Chaining the Leviathan:  The Unconstitutionality of Executing Those Con-
victed of Treason, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 99 (1983) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment 
forbids the execution of traitors); Robert D. Powers, Jr., Comment, Treason by Domiciled 
Aliens, 17 MIL. L. REV. 123 (1962) (analyzing the applicability of treason law to aliens 
domiciled within the United States), and on procedural issues, see, e.g., Lester B. Or-
field, Procedure in Treason Cases, 20 S.C. L. REV. 243 (1968) (reviewing the constitutional 
safeguards required in a trial for treason).  Other pieces have sought to use treason law 
to illuminate other areas of the law.  See, e.g., Stuart E. Abrams, Threats to the President 
and the Constitutionality of Constructive Treason, 12 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 351, 389 
(1976) (arguing that federal law “is unconstitutional to the extent that it [operates] to 
punish people solely for intending to kill the President and for manifesting that intent 
by verbal or written words alone”); Taylor Flynn, Of Communism, Treason, and Addiction:  
An Evaluation of Novel Challenges to the Military’s Anti-Gay Policy, 80 IOWA L. REV. 979, 
1030-43 (1995) (discussing attempts to use the Treason Clause to challenge the mili-
tary’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy); Monika Jain, Comment, Mitigating the Dangers of 
Capital Convictions Based on Eyewitness Testimony Through Treason’s Two-Witness Rule, 91 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 763 (2001) (arguing that the Treason Clause’s two-
witness requirement should be adopted in all capital cases where eyewitness testimony 
is offered).  A book-length treatment of early American treason law is provided in 
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George Fletcher’s argument that treason should be moved “to the 
center of our thinking about criminal law” lest we run the risk of “dis-
torting the criminal law by overemphasizing violent crimes against 
persons.”8  It might be thought that the Treason Clause is a victim of 
its own success; that is, like Article II’s requirement that the President 
be at least thirty-five years old, the clause is a model of clarity—little 
needs to be said other than restating its basic provisions, which speak 
perfectly well for themselves.  Yet as the United States Supreme Court 
explained in one of only a handful of treason cases decided by the 
High Court, the clause’s “superficial appearance of clarity and simplic-
ity . . . proves illusory when it is put to practical application.  There are 
few subjects on which the temptation to utter abstract interpretive 
generalizations is greater or on which they are more to be distrusted.  
The little clause is packed with controversy and difficulty.”9
This Article seeks to place the Treason Clause at the heart of our 
thinking about the constitutional issues raised by the “war on terror,” 
with particular emphasis on the “enemy combatant” issue.  Under the 
constitutional law of treason, any person who is potentially subject to 
an American treason prosecution must be tried in a civilian court and 
may not be detained by the military as an enemy combatant or sub-
jected to military tribunals. 
This rule is all but forgotten today, but was once familiar to any in-
formed lawyer in the Anglo-American world.  From at least the seven-
teenth through the nineteenth centuries, English and American trea-
tise writers, public officials, and courts consistently distinguished 
between persons subject to the law of treason and persons subject to 
military authority.10  Those persons subject to the law of treason were 
entitled to trial under the ordinary processes of the criminal courts; by 
contrast, those persons not subject to the law of treason could be 
treated as enemies and subjected to military authority.  The line was 
explicitly drawn on the basis of allegiance: those persons who owed 
allegiance were subject to trial for treason; those who did not were 
subject to military authority.  Significantly, Anglo-American law has 
never held that allegiance is simply a question of citizenship.  Indeed, 
under American law, allegiance is owed to the United States by any 
person present within its borders other than those persons accompa-
BRADLEY CHAPIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TREASON:  REVOLUTIONARY & EARLY NA-
TIONAL ORIGINS (1964). 
8 Fletcher, supra note 4, at 194. 
9 Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1945). 
10 See infra Part II. 
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nying an invading military force.  Because of the broad sweep of the 
doctrine of allegiance, most suspected terrorists apprehended within 
the United States, regardless of citizenship status, owe allegiance to 
the United States and may commit treason against it.  It follows that 
such individuals cannot constitutionally be subject to military author-
ity as enemy combatants. 
This key distinction between civil and military authority, which lay 
at the heart of Anglo-American treason law, regrettably did not survive 
World War II.  In Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court approved the 
trial and execution by military authorities of a man who claimed 
American citizenship, who had aided Nazi Germany, and who was cap-
tured in the United States.11  This precedent is flatly inconsistent with 
the Treason Clause, which prohibits the government from subjecting 
to military authority an individual otherwise subject to prosecution for 
treason.  The Supreme Court affirmed this unfortunate error in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, in which the Court considered the case of an 
American citizen captured while allegedly fighting for Taliban troops 
in Afghanistan and subsequently detained in the United States under 
military authority as an “enemy combatant.”12  Although the Court 
quite properly rejected the government’s extreme position that it 
could hold Mr. Hamdi indefinitely, without access to a lawyer, and 
without an opportunity to contest the factual basis for his detention,13 
it repeated the Quirin error by holding that Hamdi was nonetheless 
subject to military authority.14  Only Justices Scalia and Stevens cor-
rectly recognized that, absent the suspension of habeas corpus, Hamdi 
was entitled to trial by an Article III court, with all of its corresponding 
procedural protections.15
This Article can be seen as an extended historical concurrence to 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hamdi, one which fleshes out the full di-
mensions of the forgotten constitutional law of treason.  This law, in 
fact, provides significantly more protection to individuals than Justice 
Scalia recognizes.16  I begin in Part I with a brief historical background 
to the Constitution’s Treason Clause, setting it in the broader context 
11 317 U.S. 1, 20, 31 (1942). 
12 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). 
13 Id. at 518. 
14 Id. at 518-20. 
15 Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Where the Government accuses a citizen of 
waging war against it, our constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal 
court for treason or some other crime.”). 
16 Justice Scalia’s limitation of his reasoning to United States citizens, e.g., id. at 
576, is not consistent with the constitutional law of treason, see infra Part II. 
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of Anglo-American legal history.  In Part II, I examine the related 
questions of allegiance and jurisdiction that lie at the heart of the 
Treason Clause’s limitation of military authority.  I conclude that, un-
til the Quirin error, treason law consistently distinguished between 
those persons who owed allegiance to the United States, who were 
subject to the civilian law of treason, and those who did not, who were 
subject to military authority.  Moreover, American law defines alle-
giance broadly, such that American citizens anywhere in the world 
owe allegiance to the United States, while persons merely present 
within the United States, other than those in the company of an invad-
ing military force, owe temporary allegiance. 
The final two Parts turn to the related question of whether terror-
ist actions fit within the traditional scope of treason law.  Although I 
believe the question of allegiance is itself dispositive of military juris-
diction, I nonetheless argue here that many acts of terrorism can be 
punished as treason.  In Part III, I argue that at least some terrorist 
acts, such as flying a commercial airplane into the Pentagon, are acts 
of “levying war” against the United States.  In Part IV, I argue that a 
terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda may constitute an “enemy” 
within the meaning of the Treason Clause, rendering any assistance by 
an American to Al Qaeda treasonous.  Parts III and IV emphasize that 
terrorist actions are not so unique and so distinctively warlike as to 
warrant removal from the ordinary criminal justice system. 
I.  THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE TREASON CLAUSE 
A.  The English Background 
No provision of the Constitution is as rooted in English legal his-
tory as the Treason Clause.  It would likely surprise most Americans to 
learn that a portion of the United States Constitution is taken almost 
verbatim from an English statute enacted when Geoffrey Chaucer was 
eight years old. The phrases “levying war” and “adhering to their 
enemies, giving them aid and comfort” in the Treason Clause come 
directly from the treason statute of 25 Edward III, enacted in 1351.17  
The statute limited treason to seven basic categories:  (1) compassing 
or imagining the death of the king, the queen, or their eldest son and 
heir; (2) violating the wife of the king or the wife of the king’s eldest 
son; (3) levying war against the king in his realm; (4) adhering to the 
17 Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2. 
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king’s enemies in his realm, giving them aid and comfort in the realm 
or elsewhere; (5) counterfeiting; (6) killing the chancellor, the treas-
urer, or the king’s justices; and (7) the murder of a master by a ser-
vant, a husband by a wife, or a prelate by a cleric.18  The last category 
was generally denominated “petty treason” to distinguish it from the 
other categories, which constituted “high treason.”  This statute effec-
tively ended the common law of treason in England.  In the early sev-
enteenth century, Sir Edward Coke wrote that the Parliament that en-
acted the statute “was called Benedictum Parliamentum, as it well 
deserved.”19  As Coke explained, “[f]or except it be Magna Carta, no 
other Act of Parliament has had more honour given unto it by the 
King, Lords Spiritual and temporal, and the Commons of the 
Realm . . . than this Act concerning treason has had.”20  The history of 
English treason law is a series of variations on the themes laid down in 
this statute, which remains in force in England today. 
B.  Treason Law in America 
By the time that colonial Americans began their successful treason 
against the King of Great Britain, English courts and commentators 
had spent over four hundred years parsing the words of the medieval 
treason statute.  English treason trials had often involved acts of high 
daring and intrigue, from noblemen raising the standard of revolt and 
attempting to seize the throne to Guy Fawkes and his co-conspirators 
plotting to blow up the Palace of Westminster at the opening of Par-
liament.21  Although treason defendants came from all classes of soci-
ety, many were among the most powerful people in the realm.  During 
the English Revolution, even the King himself was tried, convicted, 
and executed for treason.22
Like their English counterparts, colonial Americans revered the 
treason statute of 25 Edward III.  A widely circulated treatise, English 
18 Id. 
19 EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 
(London, 5th ed. 1671) (italics added).  In quotations from older sources, I have mod-
ernized spelling, capitalization, and punctuation when such modification can aid clar-
ity without compromising meaning. 
20 Id. 
21 On Guy Fawkes and the Gunpowder Plot, see ANTONIA FRASER, FAITH AND 
TREASON:  THE STORY OF THE GUNPOWDER PLOT (1996). 
22 For an insightful analysis of treason trials during the English Revolution, includ-
ing the trial of Charles I, see D. ALAN ORR, TREASON AND THE STATE:  LAW, POLITICS, 
AND IDEOLOGY IN THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR (2002). 
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Liberties, or the Free-born Subject’s Inheritance, ranked the treason statute 
alongside the Magna Carta and the Habeas Corpus Act.23  With the 
exception of such notable prosecutions as the 1702 trial of Nicholas 
Bayard in New York,24 however, actual treason trials in America were 
rare.  In Pennsylvania, for example, only one person, a counterfeiter 
named Edward Hunt, was convicted of treason prior to the American 
Revolution.25
With the outbreak of the Revolution, however, treason became a 
matter of immediate and pressing importance.  In June 1776, the 
Continental Congress recommended that each of the colonies enact 
laws defining and punishing treason.  The congressional resolution 
stated that “all persons, members of, or owing allegiance to any of the 
United Colonies . . . who shall levy war against any of the said colonies 
within the same, or be adherent to the king of Great Britain . . . giving 
to him . . . aid and comfort, are guilty of treason against such col-
ony.”26  The colonies responded by enacting legislation that generally 
tracked the language of the congressional resolution. 
The most noteworthy aspect of both the congressional resolution 
and the state treason statutes that followed it is the abolition of trea-
son by compassing or imagining the death of the king.  There was no 
longer a king in America, of course, but the crime might easily have 
been adapted to apply, for example, to state governors, the president 
of the Continental Congress, or the commander of the Continental 
Army.  No such notion was ever broached, however, and the crime of 
compassing or imagining the king’s death disappeared entirely from 
American law.27  The states also uniformly changed the punishment 
for treason from the grisly English disembowelment procedure28 to 
simple death by hanging.29
23 HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT’S INHERITANCE 62 
(W.N. ed., Boston, 5th ed. 1721). 
24 Trial of Colonel Bayard, (1702) 14 Howell’s St. Trials 471 (Honourable Coun-
cil) (N.Y.). 
25 3 MINUTES OF THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL OF PENNSYLVANIA 109-10 (Phila., Jo. 
Severns & Co. 1852). 
26 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 475 (Worthington Chauncey Ford 
ed., 1906). 
27 But see State v. M’Donald, 1837 WL 631, at *4 (Ala. 1837) (holding that the Eng-
lish case law under the compassing clause was relevant to evaluating the intent element 
under an Alabama statute prohibiting the encouragement of a slave rebellion). 
28 As Blackstone described it: 
The punishment of high treason in general is very solemn and terrible.  1.  
That the offender be drawn to the gallows, and not to be carried or walk; 
though usually a sledge or hurdle is allowed, to preserve the offender from 
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When the Constitutional Convention convened in 1787, treason 
was hardly among the most momentous of the issues confronting the 
delegates.  Nonetheless, they viewed the crime’s definition as serious 
enough to warrant inclusion in the Constitution itself.30  The dele-
gates limited treason to two particular offenses:  “levying war” against 
the United States and “adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and 
comfort.”31  This language came directly from the statute of 25 Ed-
ward III.32  Circumstantial evidence suggests that James Wilson, who 
had served as defense counsel in several prominent Pennsylvania trea-
son trials during the War for Independence, played a significant role 
in shaping the final contours of the Treason Clause.33  In his famous 
law lectures of 1790, Wilson would explain that the Constitution’s 
definition of treason was deliberately “transcribed from a part of the 
statute of Edward the third” so that its language would be “recom-
mended by the mature experience, and ascertained by the legal inter-
pretation, of numerous revolving centuries.”34  Wilson added: 
This statute has been in England, except during times remarkably tyran-
nical or turbulent, the governing rule with regard to treasons ever since.  
Like a rock, strong by nature, and fortified, as successive occasions re-
quired, by the able and honest assistance of art, it has been impregnable 
by all the rude and boisterous assaults, which have been made upon it, at 
different quarters, by ministers and judges; and as an object of national 
security, as well as of national pride, it may well be styled the legal Gi-
braltar of England.
35
the extreme torment of being dragged on the ground or pavement.  2.  That 
he be hanged by the neck, and then cut down alive.  3.  That his entrails be 
taken out, and burned, while he is yet alive.  4.  That his head be cut off.  5.  
That his body be divided into four parts.  6.  That his head and quarters be at 
the king’s disposal. 
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *92.  The mechanics of this procedure are 
thoroughly explored in JOHN BELLAMY, THE TUDOR LAW OF TREASON 201-20 (1979).  
Bellamy notes that in Tudor England, “the more demanding arts of decollation and 
disemboweling, which were peculiar to the crime of treason, were rarely practiced with 
great competence.”  Id. at 201. 
29 CHAPIN, supra note 7, at 45. 
30 For an overview of the Treason Clause in the Constitutional Convention, see 
HURST, supra note 6, at 126-66. 
31 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
32 Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2. 
33
 HURST, supra note 6, at 135. 
34 2 JAMES WILSON, Of Crimes, Immediately Against the Community, in THE WORKS OF 
JAMES WILSON 663, 665 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). 
35 Id. at 664. 
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Wilson’s argument that the Treason Clause must be interpreted in 
light of 25 Edward III was subsequently endorsed by Chief Justice John 
Marshall on circuit,36 by Justice Story in his famous Commentaries,37 and 
by the United States Supreme Court in the 1945 case of Cramer v. 
United States.38
The delegates abandoned the remaining offenses in the English 
statute, however, and significantly tightened the standard of proof.  
Although English law had long required two witnesses and proof of an 
overt act, the Constitution required “two witnesses to the same overt 
act” in order to support a conviction.39  In the Pennsylvania ratifying 
convention, Wilson pointedly noted: 
This punishment, and the description of this crime, are the great sources 
of danger and persecution, on the part of government, against the citi-
zen.  Crimes against the state! and against the officers of the state!  His-
tory informs us that more wrong may be done on this subject than on 
any other whatsoever.
40
II.  TREASON, ALLEGIANCE, AND MILITARY JURISDICTION 
A core principle of the forgotten constitutional law of treason is 
the distinction between civilian and military authority.  Until the twen-
tieth century, Anglo-American law consistently recognized that per-
sons subject to the law of treason are not subject to military authority.  
Under what conditions, though, is a person subject to the law of trea-
36 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 159 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 
1807) (No. 14,693) (“It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose . . . that the term ‘levying 
war’ is used in that instrument in the same sense in which it was understood in Eng-
land, and in this country, to have been used in the statute of the 25th of Edw. III. from 
which it was borrowed.”). 
37 See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 1791, 1793 (1833) (describing the statute as “the pole star of English juris-
prudence upon this subject” and noting that by adopting the language of the statute, 
the Constitution “recognized the well-settled interpretation of these phrases in the 
administration of criminal law, which has prevailed for ages”). 
38 325 U.S. 1, 18 (1945) (“We can read this statute only as our forebears read it—
through the eyes of succeeding generations of English judges, to whom it has been the 
core of all decision, and of common-law commentators, to whom it has been the 
text.”). 
39 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (emphasis added). 
40 The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, in 2 THE DEBATES 
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITU-
TION 415, 469 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Phila., J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1836) (statement 
of James Wilson); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 241 ( James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting the importance of the Treason Clause as a restraint on gov-
ernmental power). 
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son?  The Treason Clause itself is silent on this question, and it is 
tempting simply to assume that only American citizens may be prose-
cuted for treason.41  American treason law, however, consistently holds 
that treason is not a breach of citizenship, but a breach of allegiance.  
Persons other than citizens can be tried for treason in circumstances 
in which they can be said to owe a “local” or “temporary” allegiance to 
the United States.  The sources that bear on this issue, however, are 
decidedly eclectic, and its full contours have never been subjected to 
significant academic scrutiny. 
I begin the analysis in Section A with a review of the English trea-
tises that interpreted the statute of 25 Edward III and which were 
widely cited in America both before and after the adoption of the 
Constitution’s Treason Clause.  These treatises recognize that a wide 
variety of noncitizens can be said to owe allegiance to the English 
crown.  As a corollary, the treatises distinguish between persons sub-
ject to the law of treason and persons subject to military authority.  
Section B turns to various early American precedents, including the 
important decisional law prior to the drafting of the Constitution and 
early interpretations of the Constitution itself.  Section C discusses the 
treason trial of John Brown, which pointedly raised the issue of trea-
son and allegiance in the context of whether Brown could be guilty of 
treason against the State of Virginia, a state of which he was neither a 
citizen nor a resident.  Section D briefly recounts the experience of 
the Confederate States of America dealing with the same issue under 
their constitution.  Section E examines the 1873 Carlisle case, the Su-
preme Court’s most extensive treatment of this subject.  Finally, Sec-
tion F reviews the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Quirin and ar-
gues that the Court fundamentally misunderstood American treason 
law and accordingly rendered the procedural protections of Article III 
a virtual nullity. 
A.  The English Treatises 
The problem of distinguishing between those persons subject to 
the law of treason and those persons subject to the law of war was a 
familiar one to the English jurists who provided the first commentar-
ies on English treason law.  Although the statute of 25 Edward III did 
not by its terms make any such distinction, the commentators recog-
nized that such a distinction was implicit in the very definition of trea-
41 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 116 (1988) (asserting that 
treason “can be committed only by a citizen”). 
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son itself.  The earliest of these commentators was Sir Edward Coke, 
who explained: 
[A]ll aliens that are within the realm of England, and whose sovereigns 
are in amity with the king of England, are within the protection of the 
king, and do owe a local obedience to the king . . . and if they commit 
high treason against the king, they shall be punished as traitors; but oth-
erwise it is of an enemy.
42
Under this formulation, mere presence in the realm of England, 
rather than actual residence, would seem to be sufficient to create a 
local allegiance.  Coke cited his own decision in Calvin’s Case, in which 
Coke had explained, “[W]hen an alien that is in amity comes into 
England, because as long as he is within England, he is within the 
king’s protection; therefore so long as he is here, he owes unto the 
king a local obedience or allegiance.”43  But if an “alien enemy come 
to invade . . . [is] taken in war,” the report continues, “he cannot be 
indicted of treason . . . for he never was in the protection of the king 
nor ever owed any manner of allegiance unto him, but malice and 
enmity, and therefore he shall be put to death by martial law.”44
Writing in the early eighteenth century, William Hawkins con-
tended in his Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, “Also it seems clear, that 
the subjects of a foreign prince coming into England and living under 
the protection of our king, may, in respect of that local allegiance 
which they owe to him, be guilty of high treason.”45  Indeed, “even an 
ambassador committing a treason against the king’s life, may be con-
demned and executed here.”46  By contrast, when “aliens” invade the 
42 COKE, supra note 19, at 4-5; see also CARE, supra note 23, at 65 (paraphrasing 
these lines from Coke). 
43 (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 383 (K.B.).  The case concerned whether a citizen of 
Scotland could hold real property in England following the ascension of James VI of 
Scotland to the throne of England.  Id. at 379.  The court held that a Scottish citizen 
born after the accession of James VI to the throne of England could not be deemed an 
alien within England.  Id. at 394.  For a thorough discussion of the historical back-
ground to Calvin’s Case, see Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Cal-
vin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73 (1997).  Price notes that: 
 Coke’s report of Calvin’s Case was one of the most important English com-
mon-law decisions adopted by courts in the early history of the United States.  
Rules of citizenship derived from Calvin’s Case became the basis of the Ameri-
can common-law rule of birthright citizenship, a rule that was later embodied 
in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution . . . . 
Id. at 74 (footnote omitted). 
44 Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 384. 
45 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 35 (Savoy 1716) 
(italics omitted). 
46 Id. 
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kingdom in a “hostile manner,” they “cannot be punished as traitors, 
but shall be dealt with by martial law.”47  Under Hawkins’s formula-
tion, a subject of a foreign prince could owe local allegiance regard-
less of whether that prince was at amity with the king of England.  
Moreover, Hawkins’s requirement of “living under the protection of 
our king” suggests that mere presence within England may be insuffi-
cient to create a local allegiance. 
Matthew Hale’s influential The History of the Pleas of the Crown ex-
panded on the views articulated by Coke and Hawkins.  Because each 
subject received “protection from the king and his laws,” he was ac-
cordingly “bound by his allegiance to be true and faithful to the 
king.”48  “And hence it is, that if an alien enemy come into this king-
dom hostilely to invade it, if he be taken, he shall be dealt with as an 
enemy, but not as a traitor, because he violates no trust nor alle-
giance.”49  A different rule obtains, however, when the alien has been 
living within the king’s realm.  As Hale explained, “if an alien, the sub-
ject of a foreign prince in amity with the king live here, and enjoy the 
benefit of the king’s protection, and commit a treason, he shall be 
judged and executed, as a traitor; for he owes a local allegiance.”50  In 
the event that a war is declared between the alien’s sovereign and the 
king of England, if “that alien continues here in England without re-
turning to his natural sovereign, but under the cover and protection 
of the king of England commits a treason, he shall be judged and exe-
cuted as a traitor; for by continuing here he continues the owning of 
his former local allegiance.”51  Hale further explained that if 
the subject of a foreign prince in war with ours come into England and 
here trade and inhabit either as a merchant, dweller, or sojourner, if 
such a person compass the death of the king, he may be dealt with as a 
traitor, because he comes not hither as an enemy or by way of hostility, 
but partakes of the king’s protection.
52
This rule rested on the broad principles of Magna Carta, under which 
“every foreigner living publicly and trading here [in England] is un-
der the king’s protection.”53  Departing from Hawkins, Hale con-
47 Id. 
48 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 59 (Savoy 1736). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 60. 
52 Id. at 92-93. 
53 Id. at 93. 
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cluded that a foreign ambassador must always be dealt with “as an en-
emy by the law of war or nations, and not as a traitor.”54
Michael Foster, writing in the middle of the eighteenth century, 
generally concurred with the reasoning of his predecessors, although 
he introduced a distinction between “local allegiance,” owed by aliens 
whose sovereign was at amity with England, and “temporary local alle-
giance,” owed by those whose sovereign was not.  “An alien whose sov-
ereign is in amity with the crown of England, residing here [in Eng-
land] and receiving the protection of the law owes a local allegiance 
to the crown during the time of his residence” and may be dealt with 
as a traitor, since “his person and personal estate are as much under 
the protection of the law as the natural-born subject’s and if he is in-
jured in either, he has the same remedy at law for such injury.”55  An 
“alien whose sovereign is at enmity with us living here under the 
king’s protection . . . may likewise be dealt with as a traitor.  For he 
owes a temporary local allegiance, founded on that share of protec-
tion he receives.”56  Foster’s emphasis on residence suggests that an 
alien merely passing through England may not owe either form of al-
legiance. 
William Blackstone devoted far less attention to this issue than any 
of his predecessors.  In the first volume of his Commentaries, he stated, 
“Local allegiance is such as is due from an alien, or stranger born, for 
so long time as he continues within the king’s dominion and protec-
tion:  and it ceases, the instant such stranger transfers himself from 
this kingdom to another.”57  In his chapter on high treason, Black-
stone recalled the distinction between natural and local allegiance 
and explained that treason was an offense that was a “breach of this 
duty of allegiance, whether natural and innate, or local and acquired 
by residence.”58
The treatise literature thus firmly supports two broad proposi-
tions.  First, noncitizens residing within England owed a local alle-
giance to the English crown, and a breach of that allegiance by com-
mitting one of the acts enumerated in the statute of 25 Edward III was 
54 Id. at 96. 
55 MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION OF 
OYER AND TERMINER AND GOAL DELIVERY FOR THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 
1746 IN THE COUNTY OF SURRY, AND OF OTHER CROWN CASES, TO WHICH ARE ADDED 
DISCOURSES UPON A FEW BRANCHES OF THE CROWN LAW 185 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 
1762). 
56 Id. 
57 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *358. 
58 4 id. at *74. 
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treason appropriately punished by the civil courts, not by the military.  
Second, alien enemies captured as part of an invading force are not 
subject to the law of treason but instead are subject to military author-
ity.  In short, there was a fundamental distinction, rooted in alle-
giance, between those persons subject to civilian authority and those 
persons subject to military authority with respect to crimes against the 
state.  These propositions are so firmly established that they can be 
said to be part of the general English law of treason with which the 
Framers and ratifiers of the United States Constitution were familiar.59  
What is somewhat less clear is whether persons merely present within 
the kingdom, but not in the company of a hostile invading force, owe 
such a local allegiance.  As noted, Coke seems to suggest that mere 
presence is enough, whereas other authors seem implicitly to require 
something more. 
B.  Early American Precedents 
1.  The Continental Congress 
The colonial period of American history does not appear to have 
raised the issues of temporary and local allegiance and the scope of 
military jurisdiction in any significant fashion.  On June 24, 1776, 
however, the Continental Congress recommended that the individual 
states enact treason legislation.  The resolution stated that 
all persons abiding within any of the United Colonies, and deriving pro-
tection from the laws of the same, owe allegiance to the said laws, and 
are members of such colony; and . . . all persons passing through, visit-
ing, or make [sic] a temporary stay in any of the said colonies, being en-
titled to the protection of the laws during the time of such passage, visi-
tation, or temporary stay, owe, during the same time, allegiance thereto.
60
59 In the 1807 treason trial of Aaron Burr, Chief Justice Marshall stated that when 
interpreting the Treason Clause, 
[p]rinciples laid down by such writers as Coke, Hale, Foster, and Blackstone, 
are not lightly to be rejected.  These books are in the hands of every student.  
Legal opinions are formed upon them; and those opinions are afterwards car-
ried to the bar, the bench and the legislature.  In the exposition of terms, 
therefore, used in instruments of the present day, the definitions and dicta of 
those authors, if not contradicted by adjudications, and if compatible with the 
words of the statute, are entitled to respect. 
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 160 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) 
(No. 14,693); see also HURST, supra note 6, at 7-8 (arguing that English legal treatises 
are the most useful sources for interpreting the Treason Clause). 
60 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 26, at 475. 
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The resolution further specified that any person who levied war 
against his colony or adhered to the king of Great Britain or other 
enemies of the colonies would be guilty of treason against the col-
ony.61  The scope of this resolution is significant, as Congress squarely 
stated what had been only implicit in some of the English treatises—
that even a temporary visit to the United States imposes duties of tem-
porary allegiance, the breach of which is treason.  Many states quickly 
responded by enacting treason legislation that substantially tracked 
the language of the congressional resolution.62
Two months later, Congress resolved “that all persons not owing 
allegiance to America, ‘found lurking as spies in or about the fortifica-
tions or encampments of the armies of the United States’” would be 
subject to punishment by court-martial.63  Again, Congress recognized 
an important distinction with respect to military jurisdiction between 
those persons who owed allegiance to the United States and those 
who did not.  General George Washington would later disapprove a 
court-martial sentence of a New Jersey man for “taking arms to the 
enemy.”64  Washington stated that he was “not fully satisfied of the le-
gality of trying an inhabitant of any state by military law, when the civil 
authority of that state has made provision for the punishment of per-
sons taking arms with the enemy.”65
2.  The Chapman Case 
In 1781, in Respublica v. Chapman,66 the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court was squarely confronted with the issue of who could be said to 
owe allegiance to the State of Pennsylvania.  As this is the only Ameri-
can decision predating the Constitution addressing this issue, it is 
worth considering in some detail.  The defendant, Samuel Chapman, 
had left the State of Pennsylvania in December 1776 and joined the 
British army.67  On June 15, 1778, the Supreme Executive Council, the 
state’s governing executive board, proclaimed Chapman attainted of 
61 Id. 
62 See HURST, supra note 6, at 116-17 n.35 (providing citations to laws enacted in 
nine states by the end of 1777). 
63 LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 9 (2005) (quot-
ing 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 26, at 693). 
64 Id. at 10. 
65 Id. (quoting 11 GEORGE WASHINGTON, THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 
262 ( John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1934)). 
66 1 Dall. 53 (Pa. 1781). 
67 Id. at 53. 
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treason.68  In 1780, Chapman was captured on board a British ship 
and subsequently brought to Pennsylvania.69  Pursuant to the attain-
der proclamation, Chapman was brought before the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court to provide reasons why execution should not be ren-
dered against him as an attainted traitor.  Chapman asserted that he 
never owed allegiance to the State of Pennsylvania and therefore 
could not commit treason against it.70  In the subsequent jury trial, 
Chapman’s attorney pointed to the chaotic interregnum that followed 
the collapse of royal government in Pennsylvania after independence 
and argued that there was no functioning government in Pennsylvania 
when Chapman departed.71  Since he was receiving no protection, he 
could owe no allegiance.72  Moreover, when Pennsylvania’s new gov-
ernment finally passed an act for the revival of the laws, the act stated 
that the laws were not in effect from May 14, 1776, to February 11, 
1777.73  The state’s treason statute, passed on this later date, extended 
only to those people then residing in Pennsylvania.74  The state’s at-
torney general, William Bradford, responded that throughout the pe-
riod in question “a government under the authority of the people was 
administered by councils, committees, and conventions,” and Chap-
man was therefore a subject of Pennsylvania in December 1776 when 
he joined the British army.75
This was not a new issue to the presiding judge, Chief Justice 
Thomas McKean.  In August 1779, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Executive 
Council had requested McKean’s opinion on whether the state’s trea-
son statute extended to persons who had either departed the state 
prior to the Declaration of Independence or departed prior to the 
enactment of the statute.76  McKean replied that “treason being an of-
fence, against government and tending to its dissolution, could not be 
68 Id. 
69 Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania ( June 26, 1780), in 
12 COLONIAL RECORDS OF PENNSYLVANIA 400 (AMS Press, Inc. 1968) (1853); Letter 
from Joseph Reed, President, Supreme Executive Council, to Jeremiah Powell, Presi-
dent, Massachusetts Bay (May 19, 1780), in 8 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 254 (Samuel 
Hazard ed., Phila., Joseph Severns & Co. 1853). 
70 Chapman, 1 Dall. at 53. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 54. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 54-55. 
76 Letter from Thomas McKean, Chief Justice, to Joseph Reed, President, Supreme 
Executive Council (Aug. 13, 1779), in 7 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES, supra note 69, at 644. 
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committed in Pennsylvania until a new government was formed.”77  He 
admitted that the turbulence of 1776 made it unclear exactly when 
the government was formed and concluded that in such an “unprece-
dented and doubtful” case, only those people who resided in the state 
on February 11, 1777, could be subject to the treason laws; those who 
departed earlier should be treated under military law as prisoners of 
war.78
The Chief Justice drew on this advisory opinion in his charge to 
the jury in the Chapman case,79 but the intervening two years had re-
sulted in a subtle transformation of his views.  He now asserted that 
sovereignty had been lodged in Congress and in the councils and 
committees of safety that had taken an active role in governing the 
state.80  In any event, allegiance was due to Pennsylvania at least from 
November 28, 1776, when Pennsylvania’s new legislature convened.81  
Although no treason statute had then been enacted, treason “might 
certainly have been committed, before the different qualities of the 
crime were defined, and its punishment declared by positive law.”82  
Chapman may therefore have been subject to the subsequently en-
acted treason law, but for the peculiar drafting of the January 28, 
1777, act for the revival of the laws, which seemed to imply that the 
common law had ceased in Pennsylvania from independence until the 
act itself renewed it.83  On February 11, 1777, the legislature had de-
clared that allegiance was due only from those persons then in the 
state, or who should thereafter become inhabitants.84  The most sensi-
ble reading of this statute, McKean held, was that the legislature in-
tended “to allow a choice of his party to every man,” consistent with 
the right to choose one’s own side in a civil war.85
77 Id. at 645. 
78 Id. 
79 Treason cases were tried in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court itself, sitting as a 
Court of Oyer and Terminer.  The only appeal lay to the Supreme Executive Council 
for clemency.  JOHN M. COLEMAN, THOMAS MCKEAN:  FORGOTTEN LEADER OF THE 
REVOLUTION 223, 230, 240-41 (1975). 
80 Chapman, 1 Dall. at 56. 
81 Id. at 57. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 58. 
84 Id. at 58-59. 
85 Id. at 59.  Historian James Kettner ties the Chapman decision to the developing 
idea of “volitional allegiance,” that is, the idea that citizenship can be a matter of per-
sonal choice and not fixed immutably at birth.  See JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 194-97 (1978) (indicating that citizen-
ship in the years immediately after independence resulted from an act demonstrating 
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McKean’s two opinions suggest that he too read temporary alle-
giance broadly, such that it would encompass all those within the ter-
ritory of a functioning government.  He nonetheless tied that alle-
giance tightly to the existence of a government (as opposed to society 
or the state in general).  Presumably, the absence of government re-
sults in the destruction of the reciprocal ties of protection and alle-
giance upon which a treason charge is ultimately predicated.86  More-
over, he recognized the important distinction between those persons 
subject to the law of treason and those persons subject to military au-
thority. 
3.  The United States Constitution and Subsequent Explications 
Like the statute of 25 Edward III, the Treason Clause of the 
United States Constitution does not, by its own terms, say anything 
about allegiance.  Nothing in the records of the Constitutional Con-
vention or the ratifying debates indicates that anybody gave the issue 
of allegiance any thought.  When the First Congress convened in 
1789, however, it promptly enacted a treason statute that contained an 
explicit allegiance requirement, providing punishment for “any per-
son or persons owing allegiance to the United States of America” who 
committed treason.87  The statute also defined misprision of treason, 
although, curiously, the statute did not by its terms limit this crime to 
those persons owing allegiance to the United States.88  In United States 
v. Wiltberger, Chief Justice Marshall explained that this was a distinc-
tion without a difference: 
Treason is a breach of allegiance, and can be committed by him only 
who owes allegiance either perpetual or temporary.  The words, there-
assent to be bound by the government).  Issues similar to those in Chapman were raised 
in McIlvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, in which the United States Supreme Court held that a man 
who left New Jersey in 1777 remained a citizen of New Jersey and owed allegiance to it.  
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209, 215 (1808); see also KETTNER, supra, at 199-204 (summarizing 
the holding and background of McIlvaine).  The court based its decision largely on 
contemporary New Jersey legislative pronouncements to that effect.  McIlvaine, 8 U.S. 
(4 Cranch) at 214.  Arguments of counsel in McIlvaine are reported at 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 280 (1804). 
86 In 1776, South Carolina Chief Justice William Henry Drayton argued in a grand 
jury charge that an American could not be guilty of treason against the King of Great 
Britain, given that the King had declared the Americans out of his protection, thereby 
absolving Americans’ obligations of allegiance.  See WILLIAM HENRY DRAYTON, A 
CHARGE ON THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 5 (Charlestown, David Bruce 1776). 
87 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 112, 112 (current version at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2381 (2000)). 
88 Id. § 2. 
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fore, “owing allegiance to the United States,” in the first section, are en-
tirely surplus words, which do not in the slightest degree, affect its sense.  
The construction would be precisely the same were they omitted.
89
In his law lectures of 1790, James Wilson attempted to clarify the 
law on who could commit treason in America.  Because Wilson, for-
mer defense counsel to accused traitors during the Revolution, played 
such a significant role in drafting the Treason Clause of the Constitu-
tion,90 his remarks merit considerable attention.  Wilson contended 
that English law on this subject was needlessly convoluted, and he 
proposed a simpler rubric:  any person who owed obedience to the 
United States could commit treason against it.  Who owed such obedi-
ence?  Any person who received protection from the United States.91  
Wilson explained that the term “obedience” was preferable to the 
term “allegiance,” because “in England, allegiance is considered as 
due to the natural, as well as to the moral person of the king; to the 
man, as well as to the represented authority of the nation.”92  By con-
trast, in America, “the authority of the nation is the sole object on one 
side.”93  Wilson was evidently quite proud of this formulation, which 
he described as “plain and easy, as well as proper and accurate.”94  
Moreover, everyone “without the possibility of a mistake” could know 
whether he owed such obedience, since “[e]very one has a monitor 
within him, which can tell whether he feels protection from the au-
thority of the United States; if he does, to that authority he owes obe-
dience.”95  The value of this latter assertion, which seems to add a par-
ticularly subjective element to the law, is arguable.  What is clear, 
however, is the greater clarity that the “protection” standard brings 
over the older English precedents.  A person openly traveling within 
the United States, even for only a day or two, is entitled to protection 
by the United States, even though that person is clearly not a citizen, 
and may not meet refined tests of “local allegiance.”  Indeed, the only 
persons in the United States who would not receive protection would 
89 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 97 (1820).  In an earlier decision, the Court had held 
that the crime of misprision of treason as set forth in a federal statute defining and 
punishing certain acts committed on the high seas was “necessarily confined to any 
person or persons owing permanent or temporary allegiance to the United States.”  
United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818). 
90 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
91 2 WILSON, supra note 34, at 664-66. 
92 Id. at 666 (footnote omitted). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
 
884 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 863 
 
be those who had covertly entered for hostile purposes and who have 
no intention of ever invoking government aid, or those who had en-
tered with an invading force. 
In 1806, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation echoing the August 
1776 resolution of the Continental Congress.96  The statute provided 
that, in times of war, “all persons not citizens of, or owing allegiance to the 
United States of America, who shall be found lurking as spies, in or about 
the fortifications or encampments of the armies of the United States,” 
could be sentenced to death by court-martial.97  The limitation, again, 
is significant.  Citizens or other persons owing allegiance simply were 
not subject to military authority for actions of this sort, even in time of 
war. 
During the War of 1812, New York’s highest court ruled that per-
sons subject to the law of treason could not be subject to military au-
thority.98  Affirming a $779.25 damages verdict against a federal mili-
tary officer for illegally detaining an American citizen, the court held: 
None of the offences charged against [the detainee] were cognizable by 
a court-martial, except that which related to his being a spy; and if he 
was an American citizen, he could not be charged with such an offence.  
He might be amenable to the civil authority for treason; but could not 
be punished under martial law, as a spy.
99
The court emphasized that “[i]f the defendant was justifiable in doing 
what he did, every citizen of the United States would, in time of war, 
be equally exposed to a like exercise of military power and author-
ity.”100  The detainee was a naturalized American citizen, and thus the 
96 For a description of the August 1776 resolution, see supra note 63 and accom-
panying text. 
97 Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch. 20, art. 101, § 2, 2 Stat. 359, 371 (emphasis added). 
98 Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815). 
99 Id. at 265. 
100 Id. at 266 (italics omitted).  In 1867, the Illinois Supreme Court relied in part 
on Smith v. Shaw to uphold damages awards against federal officials for detaining an 
Illinois citizen for allegedly being an “active member of a disloyal secret society known 
as the ‘Knights of the Golden Circle’” and for being “deeply engaged in aiding said 
society in their treasonable purposes.”  Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142, 145, 159 (1867).  
The court held that the military had no authority over such individuals and noted that 
even during the 1790s in England, the Pitt administration “acted only through the or-
dinary agencies of the civil courts, and made no use of the military arm under the pre-
tense that the offending persons were belligerents or public enemies.”  Id. at 160. 
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court had no occasion to discuss the broader issues of temporary and 
local allegiance.101
During the first half of the nineteenth century, American courts 
made occasional pronouncements on the nature of temporary or local 
allegiance, although seldom in the context of treason.102  The issue of 
temporary and local allegiance thus fell into somnolence, until the 
night of October 16, 1859. 
C.  The Treason Trial of John Brown 
That night, John Brown and eighteen armed men, who had been 
hiding out on a farm in Maryland, crossed the Potomac River over the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad bridge and seized a federal arsenal in 
the small town of Harper’s Ferry, Virginia.103  The avowed purpose of 
John Brown’s Raid, as it became known, was to encourage a wide-
spread slave revolt.104  The raid, poorly planned and clumsily exe-
cuted, was quickly suppressed by federal troops led by Robert E. Lee 
and J.E.B. Stuart.105  Although antislavery activists throughout the 
101 For further analysis of the case and others from the War of 1812, see Ingrid 
Brunk Wuerth, The President’s Power To Detain “Enemy Combatants”:  Modern Lessons from 
Mr. Madison’s Forgotten War, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1567, 1580-93 (2004). 
102 See, e.g., The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227, 246 (1817) (“[A] person domi-
ciled in a country, and enjoying the protections of its sovereign, is deemed a subject of 
that country.  He owes allegiance to the country, while he resides in it . . . .”); Charge 
to Grand Jury—Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1047, 1049 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851) (No. 18,276) 
(“[T]reason against the United States may be committed by any one resid[ing] or so-
journing within its territory and under the protection of its laws, whether he be a citi-
zen or alien.”); Puckett v. Pope, 3 Ala. 552, 555 (1842) (“A citizen of one State, who 
comes within the territory of another, contracts a temporary allegiance to it, and may 
be subjected to the process of its Courts, and bound personally by a judgment there 
rendered.”); Dunham v. Lamphere, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 268, 275 (1855) (“And surely 
those inhabitants of other states, who come within the territorial limits of this state, 
and thereby owe a temporary allegiance, and become amenable to its laws, have no just 
reason to complain, if . . . they are bound to conform to a salutary law, necessary for 
the common good.”); Heridia v. Ayres, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 334, 345 (1832) (“[E]very 
stranger . . . , coming within [Massachusetts’s] jurisdiction, owes a temporary alle-
giance and is bound by its laws.”); Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 462, 470 (1813) 
(“[A]n inhabitant of one state may, without changing his domicile, go into another; he 
may there contract a debt or commit a tort; and while there he owes a temporary alle-
giance to that state, is bound by its laws, and is amenable to its courts.”); Shumway v. 
Stillman, 4 Cow. 292, 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825) (quoting Bissell). 
103 See OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD, JOHN BROWN:  1800-1859:  A BIOGRAPHY FIFTY 
YEARS AFTER 426-33 (1910) (recounting the raid on Harper’s Ferry). 
104 JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE ILLUSTRATED BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM:  THE CIVIL 
WAR ERA 159 (2003). 
105 Id. at 161-62. 
 
886 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 863 
 
North seized on Brown as a hero,106 the South, always haunted by the 
specter of slave revolts, viewed Brown’s actions as direct threats to the 
very existence of the state.107  Accordingly, Brown and several of his 
men were indicted for committing treason against the State of Vir-
ginia by levying war against it, as well as for murder and conspiracy.  
Ten days after the failed raid, Brown’s trial began in nearby Charles 
Town, Virginia.108
Whether treason against an individual state was or is a viable crime 
is a fascinating question, but one that lies beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle.109  What is important for present purposes is the significant issue 
of allegiance raised by Brown’s raid.  Brown was neither a citizen nor a 
resident of Virginia, and his arrival in Virginia exactly coincided with 
his alleged act of levying war.  How then could he be guilty of treason 
against the State of Virginia?  Brown’s attorneys raised this argument, 
although they did not dwell on it at any length.  As they saw it, “no 
man is guilty of treason, unless he be a citizen of the state or govern-
ment against which the treason so alleged has been committed.”110  
Because Brown was “not bound by any allegiance to this State, [he] 
could not, therefore, be guilty of rebellion against it.”111
Virginia could be expected to counter that treason is not defined 
by citizenship but by allegiance, and that Brown was bound by tempo-
106 Id. at 164-65. 
107 Id. at 163-64. 
108 Id. at 162-63; STEPHEN B. OATES, TO PURGE THIS LAND WITH BLOOD:  A BIOG-
RAPHY OF JOHN BROWN 309 (1970).  For a narrative account of Brown’s trial, see Steven 
Lubet, John Brown’s Trial, 52 ALA. L. REV. 425 (2001).  Brown and his co-defendant suf-
fered from various sword and bullet wounds and spent the trial reclining on a cot and 
a mattress, respectively, rising occasionally to make certain points and then returning 
to their supine positions.  At one point, the case reporter notes that after the conclu-
sion of a speech, “John Brown then lay down again, drew his blanket over him, closed 
his eyes and appeared to sink in tranquil slumber.”  The Trial of John Brown for Treason 
and Insurrection, in 6 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 700, 763 ( John D. Lawson ed., 1916) 
[hereinafter The Trial of John Brown] (emphasis omitted). 
109 Even if treason against a state is a viable crime, it seems doubtful that seizing a 
federal arsenal would qualify as a state, rather than a federal, crime.  An early, largely 
unsympathetic biographer of Brown would write defensively in 1910: 
The Federal Courts, it must be remembered, were not then as important as 
today; the nearest Federal prison was at some distance, and [Governor] Wise 
had no desire to have it said that the State of Virginia was forced to hide be-
hind the skirts of the Federal Government, and to obtain its help to punish 
those who violated her soil and killed her citizens. 
VILLARD, supra note 103, at 477. 
110 The Trial of John Brown, supra note 108, at 782. 
111 Id.; see also id. at 792 (“[T]his prisoner is not a citizen of Virginia, and he there-
fore cannot be found guilty of treason.”). 
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rary or local allegiance to Virginia when he entered into its territory.  
Prosecuting attorney Andrew Hunter made this argument only 
obliquely, noting that treason could be committed by persons who are 
not citizens, although he did not explain why.112  He then moved into 
a convoluted argument involving the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Federal Constitution.  Hunter argued that Brown was in 
fact a citizen of Virginia, because Brown entered Virginia “with the 
immunities given by the Constitution” and was not “divested of the re-
sponsibilities belonging to those immunities.”113  With swelling rheto-
ric, Hunter asked: 
By the Federal Constitution, he was a citizen when he was here, and did 
that bond of Union—which may ultimately prove a bad bond to us in the 
South—allow him to come into the bosom of the Commonwealth, with 
the deadly purpose of applying the torch to our buildings and shedding 
the blood of our citizens?
114
One may well doubt the geographical and anatomical perspicuity 
of one who would equate Harper’s Ferry (on Virginia’s northern bor-
der) with the “bosom” of the commonwealth, but that is the least of 
the oddities in this argument.  The Privileges and Immunities Clause 
had never been construed to mean that any citizen of one state be-
came a citizen, even temporarily, of any other state that she happened 
to enter.115  And indeed, Hunter appeared to recognize as much when 
he abruptly shifted course and rested his argument on a provision in 
the Virginia Code that defined a Virginia citizen to include “all those 
white persons born in any other State of this Union who may become 
residents here.”116  This argument is, of course, inconsistent with the 
notion that anyone passing through Virginia is thereby a citizen of 
Virginia for the duration of her sojourn in the state.  Hunter then as-
serted that “when this man came to Virginia and planted his feet on 
Harper’s Ferry, he came there to reside and hold the place perma-
nently.”117  Hunter’s theory, apparently, was that violent seizure of 
112 Id. at 796. 
113 Id. at 797. 
114 Id. 
115 The leading decision was Justice Washington’s opinion on circuit in Corfield v. 
Coryell, which held that states could not deny certain fundamental rights to citizens of 
other states.  6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) 
(No. 3230).  Nothing in Corfield suggested that a person entering another state became 
a “temporary citizen,” for all purposes, of the state she was entering. 
116 The Trial of John Brown, supra note 108, at 797. 
117 Id. 
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property in the state was sufficient to establish legal residency.  In ad-
dition to being a doubtful statement of Virginia’s property or resi-
dency laws, this argument would seem to preclude a treason prosecu-
tion if Brown had instead intended to leave Harper’s Ferry and 
engage in a random march through the South (as documents seized 
at his hideout in Maryland indicated118). 
The court nonetheless agreed with Hunter’s argument, rejecting 
the defendant’s requested instruction that the jury could not convict 
of treason if Brown was not a citizen of Virginia, but of another 
state.119  The court said only that “the Constitution did not give rights 
and immunities alone, but also imposed responsibilities.”120  In deny-
ing Brown’s post-conviction motion for arrest of judgment, the court 
stated, “[W]herever allegiance is due, treason may be committed.”121  
The court did not explain precisely why Brown owed allegiance to 
Virginia. 
Brown’s attorneys subsequently filed an unsuccessful petition for 
review with the Virginia Court of Appeals.  Their primary argument 
was that the indictment was defective because it failed to allege that 
Brown was a citizen of Virginia or of the United States.122  They relied 
heavily on Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in United States v. Wiltberger 
and cited extensively to English authorities.123  They also argued that, 
on the merits, Brown owed no allegiance to Virginia, since he had en-
tered the state “modo guerrino.”124  “[I]f he came in the manner of an 
enemy, so as not to entitle himself to the protection of her laws,” he 
could not be charged with treason, “allegiance and protection being 
reciprocal.”125
The Brown case raises important and fundamental issues of trea-
son law.126  Two years later, a federal judge would charge a grand jury 
118 MCPHERSON, supra note 104, at 164. 
119 The Trial of John Brown, supra note 108, at 799. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 800. 
122 Petition for Writ of Error, Commonwealth v. Brown (Va. 1859), reprinted in 
RICHMOND DAILY ENQUIRER, Nov. 21, 1859, at 1. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id.  The Court of Appeals did not issue a written opinion. Writing in 1899, 
Bushrod C. Washington stated, without attribution, that the allegiance issue was “the 
only point the court of appeals found difficulty in deciding.”  Bushrod C. Washington, 
The Trial of John Brown, 11 GREEN BAG 164, 173 (1899). 
126 For a strong criticism of the court’s decision, see Daniel C. Draper, Legal Phases 
of the Trial of John Brown, 1 W. VA. HIST. 87, 103 (1940) (“The trial of John Brown was 
not only the unwitting caricature of a refined constitutional conception, not only a 
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in Massachusetts that “[e]very sojourner who enjoys our protection, is 
bound to good faith toward our government, and although an alien, 
he may be guilty of treason by cooperating either with rebels or for-
eign enemies.”127  Although this is a very broad definition of local alle-
giance, and one which likely reflected the state of the law at the time 
of Brown’s trial, it is not obvious that Brown would have met even that 
relaxed standard.  He did not receive, and clearly did not want to re-
ceive, any protection whatsoever from the government of Virginia.  
His entire time within the state was spent in hostility towards it, as evi-
denced by his attempt to create a provisional government with himself 
as the commander-in-chief.128  In this respect, he may be seen as the 
classic example familiar from the English treatises of an alien who is 
part of an invading army and is accordingly subject to military law 
rather than the law of treason. 
On the other hand, assuming that treason against a state is a valid 
crime, it is hard to see why persons from outside a state would be free 
to engage in an activity that is prohibited to that state’s own citizens.  
For example, if a group of Virginians gathered with arms and 
marched on Richmond in attempt to overthrow the state government, 
that would seem to clearly constitute treason by levying war against the 
State of Virginia.  Yet if a group of armed North Carolinians crossed 
over the border and marched on Richmond for the same purpose, it 
seems peculiar that they could not be punished for the same crime, in 
the same way that they would be as liable as Virginians for any other 
crimes they might commit while within Virginia’s jurisdiction.129  As 
Hunter seemed instinctively to grasp, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause (and other constitutional provisions as well) suggests that the 
precedents applicable to citizens of foreign countries have no applica-
tion with respect to individual states that are bound together in a fed-
eral union.  The Brown decision therefore might be read for the 
proposition that, with respect to the issue of treason against a state, 
strained and curious application of the theory of states rights, but also the Gettysburg, 
the veritable Pickett’s charge, of the judicial side of the conflict.”). 
127 Charge to Grand Jury—Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1039, 1040 (D. Mass. 1861) (No. 
18,273). 
128 See VILLARD, supra note 103, at 332-33 (describing the adoption of a constitu-
tion and the election of officers for the provisional government). 
129 For purposes of this hypothetical, I assume that the marchers were stopped be-
fore they harmed any persons or property, so as to avoid culpability for crimes other 
than treason. 
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mere presence in the state is sufficient to create liability for treason.130  
The decision, however, arguably has no applicability to the separate 
issue of aliens’ allegiance to the United States, although it nonetheless 
represents the broad approach generally taken to questions of alle-
giance.131
D.  The Confederate States of America 
When the Confederate States of America seceded from the Union, 
they adopted a constitution that was almost identical to the United 
States Constitution, including its provisions on treason.132  Although 
the Confederate Supreme Court never sat,133 Confederate attorneys 
general authored a number of formal opinions on constitutional mat-
ters.  In November 1863, Confederate Attorney General Wade Keyes 
addressed the subject of the jurisdiction of courts-martial.  Specifi-
cally, he was asked to evaluate what should be done with two groups of 
people:  (1) “disloyal citizens of Virginia, charged with enticing sol-
diers to desert, and piloting them to the enemy; and, also, furnishing 
the enemy with information of the position and movements of [Con-
federate troops]”; and (2) “an organized band of men, who shoot our 
soldiers, and rob and murder our people, but are not Federal soldiers, 
nor in our Army.”134
Keyes’s response rested firmly on the well-established distinction 
between persons subject to military authority and persons subject to 
trial for treason.  Any such person who owed “obedience to the Gov-
ernment of the Confederate States . . . [was] guilty of treason alone, in 
the first class, and in the second, of treason, murder and robbery, all 
130 It is conceivable that modern technology could create situations in which one 
could levy war against a state without ever setting foot in it.  For example, a renegade 
group could acquire short-range missiles and launch them at a neighboring state’s 
capitol building in an attempt to destroy the state government.  In such circumstances 
it would be impossible to argue that the members of the group owed any sort of alle-
giance to the other state. 
131 An 1866 West Virginia decision stated, without citation to any authority, that 
treason against the State of West Virginia could be committed only by citizens of the 
state.  See Ex parte Quarrier, 2 W. Va. 569, 572 (1866) (“Others may be enemies, but the 
citizen only may be enemy and traitor also . . . .”). 
132 See David P. Currie, Through the Looking-Glass:  The Confederate Constitution in 
Congress, 1861-1865, 90 VA. L. REV. 1257, 1266 (2004) (“[T]he Confederate Constitu-
tion . . . appeared to be a carbon copy of the Constitution of the United States.”). 
133 Id. at 1262. 
134 Wade Keyes, Jurisdiction of Courts Martial (Nov. 18, 1863), in THE OPINIONS 
OF THE CONFEDERATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, 1861-1865, at 352, 353 (Rembert W. Pat-
rick ed., 1950). 
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of which are infamous crimes.”135  Keyes concluded, “Such persons 
cannot, therefore, be tried by court martial for treason, murder or 
robbery, but must be allowed . . . ‘a speedy and public trial, by an im-
partial jury of the State and District wherein the crime shall have been 
committed.’”136  By contrast, military authority would extend to per-
sons who did not owe allegiance to the Confederacy, since they were 
“alien-enemies carrying on aggressive war without commission from 
their Government.”137  If the individuals involved were Union soldiers, 
they could be “tried by Court Martial in the same cases in which other 
prisoners of war may be tried.”138  Keyes emphasized, “The Court, on 
such trial, would have nothing to do with allegiance or treason.”139
Although obviously of no formal legal weight in American law, 
Keyes’s opinion is nonetheless important.  It demonstrates that even 
the Confederate states recognized that persons subject to the law of 
treason, including persons actively aiding the enemy and even directly 
attacking Confederate troops, must be prosecuted by civilian authori-
ties in a civilian court. 
E.  The Carlisle Case 
In the 1873 case of Carlisle v. United States,140 the United States Su-
preme Court offered its most extensive discussion to date of the scope 
of local or temporary allegiance.  The case was brought by British citi-
zens seeking to recover the value of their cotton that had been stored 
on a plantation in Alabama and which had been seized by Union offi-
cers during the Civil War.  The lower court had denied the claim on 
the ground that the claimants had been engaged in providing saltpe-
ter to the Confederate government.141  The issue in the Supreme 
Court turned on whether President Johnson’s 1868 general pardon 
and amnesty for those involved in the rebellion relieved the claimants 
of the consequences of their assistance to the Confederacy.142  The 
Court concluded that the claimants, although aliens, were clearly 
guilty of treason and thus within the general scope of the pardon.143  
135 Id. at 354. 
136 Id. (quoting CONFEDERATE CONST., art. 1, § 9, cl. 17). 
137 Id. at 353-54 (italics omitted). 
138 Id. at 354. 
139 Id. 
140 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147 (1873). 
141 Id. at 149. 
142 Id. at 151. 
143 Id. at 155-56. 
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In so doing, the Court laid down a broad interpretation of local alle-
giance.  The Court first cited a treatise on international law that 
stated: 
The rights of sovereignty . . . extend to all persons and things not privi-
leged that are within the territory.  They extend to all strangers therein, 
not only to those who are naturalized and to those who are domiciled 
therein, having taken up their abode with the intention of permanent 
residence, but also to those whose residence is transitory.  All strangers 
are under the protection of the sovereign while they are within his terri-
tories, and owe a temporary allegiance in return for that protection.
144
The Court observed that “[t]his obligation of temporary allegiance by 
an alien resident in a friendly country is everywhere recognized by 
publicists and statesmen.”145  The Court cited an 1851 report by then-
Secretary of State Daniel Webster to President Fillmore, in which Web-
ster had argued that the doctrine of temporary allegiance was “the 
universal understanding in all civilized states, and nowhere a more es-
tablished doctrine than in this country.”146  Webster had further ex-
plained: 
[I]ndependently of a residence with intention to continue such resi-
dence; independently of any domiciliation; independently of the taking 
of any oath of allegiance or of renouncing any former allegiance, it is 
well known that, by the public law, an alien or a stranger born, for so 
long a time as he continues within the dominions of a foreign govern-
ment, owes obedience to the laws of that government, and may be pun-
ished for treason or other crimes as a native-born subject might be, unless 
his case is varied by some treaty stipulation.
147
The Court finally observed that “[t]he same doctrine is stated in 
Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, East’s Crown Law, and Foster’s Discourse upon 
High Treason, all of which are treatises of approved merit.”148
The Court’s reference to Hale, East, and Foster is somewhat mis-
leading, in that it disguises the breadth of the interpretation the Court 
had just announced.  For the first time, the Court had explicitly held, 
in effect, that mere presence within the United States was sufficient to 
144 Id. at 154 (quoting RICHARD WILDMAN, 1 INSTITUTES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
40 (London, William Benning 1849)). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 155 (quoting Report from Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, U.S., to 
Millard Fillmore, President, U.S. (Dec. 23, 1851), in 6 THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 
526 (Boston, Little & Brown 1858)). 
147 Id. (quoting Report from Daniel Webster to Millard Fillmore, supra note 146, at 
526). 
148 Id. (italics added) (citations omitted). 
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create a temporary allegiance the violation of which could be treason.  
It should be noted that the Court reached this conclusion not in the 
context of a particular treason prosecution, but in the context of de-
termining the breadth of a pardon.149  Nonetheless, the treason con-
text was manifest and the Court’s holding is quite clear. 
One might well ask what protection British citizens in the Confed-
eracy were receiving from the government of the United States.  In-
deed, shortly after Carlisle, a lower court raised precisely that point.  In 
Green’s Case, which raised similar issues, the Court of Claims queried: 
[I]n the case of an alien not receiving such protection, residing in the 
territory of a belligerent, and under a government de facto which claimed 
the right and exercised the power of making laws and exacting obedi-
ence, can it be said that he owed temporary allegiance to a government 
practically at a distance, and which was at most a government de jure 
seeking to re-establish its authority by force of arms?”
150
The court reluctantly concluded that it was nonetheless bound by Car-
lisle, although it took pains to point out that the Supreme Court in 
Carlisle had addressed a more general issue for which “there was not a 
lawyer in the world who could entertain a doubt” and had “thoroughly 
overlooked” the only real point at issue.151
Nonetheless, Carlisle, combined with the earlier English and 
American precedents involving the respective spheres of military and 
civil authority, establishes two propositions.  First, any person present 
in the United States, other than in the company of an invading mili-
tary force, owes at least a temporary or local allegiance to the United 
States and can be tried for treason against the United States for acts of 
levying war or adhering to enemies of the United States while present 
within the country.152  Second, persons who owe allegiance to the 
149 Id. 
150 8 Ct. Cl. 412, 417 (1873). 
151 Id. at 419-20.  The Carlisle Court did note that the aliens at issue had been 
domiciled in Alabama prior to the outbreak of the Civil War.  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 147, 
155.  The Court did not indicate, however, whether the result would have been differ-
ent if the aliens had arrived after the commencement of hostilities.  For an earlier de-
cision emphasizing the reciprocal nature of protection and allegiance, see Cohen v. 
Wright, 22 Cal. 293, 325 (1863) (“The government owes the duty of protection to the 
people in the enjoyment of their rights, and the people owe the correlative duty of 
obedience and support to the Government.  The one is dependent on the other.”). 
152 Citizens, of course, owe allegiance to the United States even when in foreign 
countries.  See, e.g., Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 734-35 (1952) (finding that 
an American citizen living in Japan during World War II continued to owe allegiance 
to the United States, even though he also held Japanese citizenship).  By contrast, the 
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United States are not subject to military authority for acts that amount 
to treason but must be tried in the civilian courts under the full pro-
tections of Article III.  By contrast, the military has authority over 
those persons who do not owe allegiance to the United States. 
F.  Ex Parte Quirin:  The Supreme Court Flunks Treason Law 
The issue of temporary or local allegiance did not attract signifi-
cant attention during the twentieth century, although both federal 
and state courts occasionally invoked it in various contexts,153 includ-
ing a somewhat unusual prosecution for treason under a military 
commission of a Japanese citizen who assisted the Japanese in Guam 
during World War II.154  The decision of the greatest significance to 
the issues raised in this Part, however, is the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Ex parte Quirin,155 a controversial decision that the Supreme Court 
plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld relied on to justify military authority 
over an American citizen captured on a battlefield.156
The facts of Quirin can be briefly summarized.  In the summer of 
1942, German submarines approached the coasts of Long Island and 
Florida.  Under cover of darkness, four men emerged from each sub-
allegiance of a person who is merely temporarily present within the United States dis-
sipates the moment that person leaves the United States. 
153 See, e.g., Fletes-Mora v. Rogers, 160 F. Supp. 215, 218 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (“Our law 
has long recognized an alien’s obligation of ‘temporary allegiance’ to a country while 
he is within its territory.”); In re Kowalke’s Guardianship, 46 N.W.2d 275, 282 (Minn. 
1950) (stating that “all persons within the state, including aliens and strangers” while 
present in the state, “‘are under obligations of temporary, local allegiance and are enti-
tled to the state’s protection’” (quoting In re Pratt, 18 N.W.2d 147, 152 (Minn. 1945))).  
An 1892 grand jury charge by the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania squarely stated:  “Aliens 
domiciled within the state and who enjoy its protection, owe temporary allegiance to it, 
and are amenable for treason.”  The Homestead Case, 1892 WL 3637, at *6 (Pa. O. & 
T. 1892). 
154 The facts and holdings in the case, gathered from military records, are dis-
cussed in Powers, supra note 7, at 127-29, and Recent Cases, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 270, 
283-85 (1948).  Prior to World War II, Guam was occupied by the United States, and 
the defendant, although a Japanese citizen, had lived in Guam under the American-led 
government.  When the Japanese subsequently invaded and occupied the island, the 
defendant provided assistance to Japan.  Upon American recapture of the island, he 
was tried for treason by a military commission convened by the Island Commander.  
His principal defense was that his local allegiance to the United States was overridden 
by his permanent allegiance to Japan when Japan occupied Guam.  The Judge Advo-
cate General’s opinion affirming the conviction rejected this argument, relying on an 
English decision arising under somewhat similar facts in South Africa.  Powers, supra 
note 7, at 128-29. 
155 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
156 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004). 
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marine, buried their Third Reich uniforms on the beach, and donned 
civilian attire.  The men had trained at a sabotage school in Berlin 
and were instructed to destroy war industries and war facilities in the 
United States.  Although all of the men had previously lived in the 
United States, all but one were clearly German citizens; one, however, 
claimed to be a United States citizen based on the naturalization of his 
parents in the United States while he was in his minority.  The men 
were quickly apprehended in New York and in Chicago, and were 
brought before a military tribunal to be tried for offenses against the 
laws of war.157
The Supreme Court denied the men’s petitions for habeas corpus, 
concluding that they were not entitled to trial in the civilian courts 
and could appropriately be brought before military tribunals.158  The 
Court distinguished between lawful combatants, who are subject to 
capture as prisoners of war, and unlawful combatants, who may be 
tried before military tribunals for offenses against the laws of war.159  
Unlawful combatants, in the Court’s analysis, include “[t]he spy who 
secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent 
in time of war . . . or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes 
secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruc-
tion of life or property . . . .”160  The correctness of this conclusion 
need not concern us here.  What is significant for our purposes is the 
Court’s treatment of the issues of citizenship and treason.  The Court 
held: 
 Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not re-
lieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful be-
cause in violation of the law of war.  Citizens who associate themselves 
with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guid-
ance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy 
157 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20-22.  For an extensive discussion of the background facts 
and a careful analysis of the case’s reasoning, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT 
WAR 96-112 (2002).  See generally LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL:  A MILITARY 
TRIAL AND AMERICAN LAW (2003) (providing an in-depth analysis of the events leading 
up to the Quirin decision and the judicial process used against the defendants); Michal 
R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War:  The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Sabo-
teur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 63-67 (1980) (examining the considerations that went 
into choosing to prosecute the defendants before a military tribunal and criticizing the 
Court’s decision); David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 1996 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61 (re-
viewing the capture, prosecution, and appeal of the Quirin defendants). 
158 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48. 
159 Id. at 31. 
160 Id. 
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belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of 
war.
161
Accordingly, the Court did “not find it necessary to resolve” the issue 
of citizenship.162  The Court then noted that “even when committed 
by a citizen, the offense [of being an unlawful combatant] is distinct 
from the crime of treason defined in Article III, § 3 of the Constitu-
tion, since the absence of uniform essential to one is irrelevant to the 
other.”163
In reaching this conclusion, the Court fundamentally misunder-
stood American treason law and the protective purposes of the Trea-
son Clause.  At bottom, the Court’s opinion relies on two fundamental 
propositions:  (1) that an individual can be an enemy combatant as 
well as a traitor and that possible susceptibility to trial for treason in a 
civilian court does not preclude trial by the military, and (2) that the 
offense of being an unlawful combatant differs from the offense of 
treason due to the element of the uniform.  Neither of these proposi-
tions is consistent with prior law or with a due regard for the Constitu-
tion’s commitment to jury trials and to significant procedural protec-
tions for persons accused of treason. 
First, the Court’s holding that citizens are subject to military au-
thority for unlawful acts of war against the United States is an excep-
tion that completely swallows the rule of the Treason Clause.  The very 
essence of the crime of treason by aiding the enemy is doing precisely 
what the purported United States citizen in Quirin did:  wandering 
around the country without a uniform aiding the enemy during time 
of war.  Indeed, since the saboteurs did not actually harm any persons 
or property, treason is the only crime with which the United States 
citizen could have been charged in a civilian court.  Such a prosecu-
tion would have been subject to the procedural protections of the 
Treason Clause, as well as a jury trial.  Instead, by permitting designa-
tion as an enemy combatant, the Quirin Court allowed the govern-
ment to remove an individual from the civilian courts, and to subject 
him to trial, conviction, and execution by military authorities.  The 
Treason Clause, designed to establish a high procedural threshold be-
161 Id. at 37-38.  The scope of this holding is not entirely clear.  Would Quirin per-
mit a military tribunal for an American citizen who served in a German army that in-
vaded the United States?  Such activity would be lawful, rather than unlawful, combat, 
yet the Court’s broad language seems to suggest that military authority might extend to 
that circumstance as well. 
162 Id. at 20. 
163 Id. at 38. 
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fore permitting execution of those persons found to be disloyal, thus 
vanishes entirely, and the government, acting through its military arm, 
becomes free to do whatever it pleases.164
Second, the Court’s argument that the offense of being an unlaw-
ful combatant is different than the crime of treason, due to the ele-
ment of the uniform, is beside the point.  The presence or absence of 
a uniform is significant with respect to how persons are treated within 
the military system itself—that is, whether the person is held as a pris-
oner of war or tried for offenses against the law of war as an unlawful 
combatant.  But the presence or absence of a uniform says nothing 
about whether such persons belong in the military system in the first 
place.  In essence, the Court has simply recognized a trivial, additional 
element to the offense of treason, and used that element as justifica-
tion for eviscerating the Treason Clause itself.  For example, suppose 
Congress declared that any person who levies war against the United 
States with a gun is an enemy combatant and subject to military au-
thority.  Under the Quirin Court’s analysis, this would be perfectly law-
ful.  The element of the gun, which would be the jurisdictional hook 
for military authority, is irrelevant to the crime of treason; thus, levy-
ing war and levying war with a gun would be separate offenses and the 
Treason Clause would be inapplicable.  Such a result simply cannot be 
correct, yet it is indistinguishable from the Court’s analysis in Quirin 
with regard to the uniform element.  Quirin effectively holds that a 
person levying war against the United States or adhering to its ene-
mies without a uniform is subject to military authority.  Of course, it 
will almost always be the case that a person committing an act of trea-
son—levying war against the United States or adhering to its ene-
mies—will be doing so without a uniform and accordingly might be 
defined as an unlawful combatant.  As a result, any civilian accused of 
treason could be simply shunted into the military system and executed 
without any of the protections provided by Article III. 
In short, Quirin represents a significant misunderstanding of 
American treason law, deviating dramatically from long-standing prin-
164 Cf. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 329 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring) 
(“The argument [supporting military trials of civilians] is as untenable today as it was 
when cast in the language of the Plantagenets, the Tudors and the Stuarts.  It is a rank 
appeal to abandon the fate of all our liberties to the reasonableness of the judgment of 
those who are trained primarily for war.”); MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY 
36, 43 (1991) (noting that General Henry W. Halleck, who had written a textbook on 
international law prior to the Civil War, reversed verdicts for treason rendered by mili-
tary commissions in Missouri on the ground that “such charges were not triable by a 
military commission”). 
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ciples separating military and civilian jurisdiction with respect to trea-
son.  As Justice Scalia noted in Hamdi, Quirin “was not this Court’s fin-
est hour.”165  To the extent that Quirin holds that persons who owe al-
legiance to the United States may be tried by the military as enemy 
combatants, it is inconsistent with prior law, at odds with fundamental 
principles of the Constitution, and should be overruled.166
To be clear, my argument is not that a person subject to a treason 
charge may not be charged with other offenses.  Someone who sets 
fire to several major government buildings while levying war against 
the United States is subject to prosecution for both treason and arson, 
and a prosecutor could properly decide to proceed only with the ar-
son charge.  Within the civilian system, prosecutors have considerable 
discretion in the charging of offenses.  What the government cannot 
do, however, is recognize an element in addition to conduct that is 
clearly covered by the Treason Clause, and then rely on that element 
as a justification for the assertion of military authority and the elimi-
nation of a trial in a civilian court.167
The Quirin Court’s treatment of the seven noncitizens presents a 
much more difficult issue.  The obvious predicate question, which the 
Court failed to address at all, is whether they owed temporary or local 
allegiance to the United States.  If so, they were subject to the law of 
treason and could not be tried by the military.  They entered the 
country illegally, but no authority suggests that legal or illegal pres-
ence has any bearing on the question of temporary or local allegiance.  
The noncitizens were not part of an invading army, and thus did not 
rely on that army for protection.  To the extent that they ultimately 
spent time openly in the United States, they probably satisfy the Car-
165 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
166 See also HURST, supra note 6, at 148 (“The ‘absence of uniform’ . . . made the 
defendant’s conduct more dangerous simply because it enabled him to appear as what 
he was—one of the body of citizens.  And it was citizens that the limitations of the trea-
son clause were intended to protect.”). 
167 The Treason Clause likely does not preclude short-term military detentions in 
those rare battlefield situations in which the military captures a person owing alle-
giance to the United States.  Such detentions should be narrowly limited in time, how-
ever, and the individual should have the right to demand either a trial for treason in a 
civilian court or his release.  But see In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 146-48 (9th Cir. 1946) 
(holding, without discussion of the Treason Clause, that the United States military 
could hold a United States citizen as a prisoner of war).  If the individual consented to 
remaining in military custody as a prisoner of war, however, there would seem to be 
little reason not to permit this choice. 
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lisle test of temporary and local allegiance.168  By contrast, if they had 
simply remained hidden in a basement, for example, during their en-
tire time in the country, it is possible that they would never have re-
ceived the protection necessary to support temporary or local alle-
giance.  Similarly, if these noncitizens had been captured on the 
beach immediately after exiting the submarine, military jurisdiction 
would have been appropriate.169
It should be obvious that this line of inquiry has immediate rele-
vance with respect to suspected Al Qaeda members within the United 
States.  If such persons are living openly in the United States, they owe 
temporary or local allegiance to the United States and are subject to 
prosecution for treason against it.  As such, the September 11 hijack-
ers, who all lived in the United States for some period of time prior to 
the attacks, were subject to American treason law.  By contrast, if such 
individuals are apprehended prior to entry into the United States, 
military jurisdiction may be appropriate.  This of course raises the 
problem that potential terrorists who successfully enter the United 
States may receive significantly different treatment than unsuccessful 
entrants.  Why should such persons be entitled to claim the protec-
tions of the Treason Clause? 
There are several answers to this question.  First, susceptibility to 
the law of treason is not an unmitigated good.  It means that the indi-
vidual can be tried, convicted, and executed for the capital crime of 
treason against the United States, whereas the unsuccessful entrant 
cannot.  Second, the protections of the Treason Clause were created 
with the full knowledge that they would extend to persons who owed 
only temporary or local allegiance to the United States.  Nothing in 
the text or history of the Treason Clause indicates that its require-
ments may be relaxed when the individual is not a United States citi-
zen.  Third, it is not particularly anomalous that persons merely pre-
sent in the country should have some rights to which unsuccessful 
entrants do not.  The government may not seize the property of 
someone within the United States without just compensation, but it 
168 See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.  But see Powers, supra note 7, at 
129 (arguing that spies should be subject to the law of war, not the law of treason). 
169 Their situation differs significantly from that of Jose Padilla, the terrorist sus-
pect detained by United States officials at Chicago’s O’Hare airport and subsequently 
held as an enemy combatant.  Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430-31 (2004).  Be-
cause Padilla is a United States citizen, the question of temporary or local allegiance is 
irrelevant.  He owes permanent allegiance to the United States, and thus military juris-
diction cannot extend to him. 
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may order bombings of private property in other countries without 
any compensation at all. 
In short, there is every reason to believe that suspected Al Qaeda 
members within the United States are subject to the American law of 
treason. 
 
*      *      * 
 
The foregoing analysis should be sufficient to establish that any 
person subject to American treason law, whether or not the alleged 
acts are technically treasonous, may not be subjected to military juris-
diction.  Nonetheless, numerous people have argued that terrorist acts 
are so horrific, so distinctively military, and so unique that they should 
be treated differently than other crimes.  The peculiar nature of ter-
rorist acts, in other words, renders military jurisdiction particularly 
appropriate.  The remainder of this Article will demonstrate that 
many terrorist acts fit quite comfortably within traditional understand-
ings of treason law. 
III.  TERRORISM AND “LEVYING WAR” 
The Treason Clause refers to “levying war against the United 
States.”  But what exactly does this mean?  Are terrorist actions pun-
ishable under the Treason Clause?  The answers to these questions are 
far from obvious.  Although there have been a handful of twentieth-
century treason prosecutions for adhering to the enemy, there have 
been no federal treason prosecutions for levying war since the nine-
teenth century.170  American jurisprudence regarding treason by levy-
ing war therefore has a decidedly dated feel, which renders it difficult 
to make conclusions about the modern scope of the law.  Nonetheless, 
I conclude that at least certain terrorist actions constitute treason by 
levying war when committed by an individual owing allegiance to the 
United States. 
170 The Supreme Court of the Philippines decided several levying-of-war cases dur-
ing the American occupation in the early twentieth century.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Lagnason, 3 PHIL. REP. 472, 482 (S.C., Mar. 28, 1904) (finding a defendant guilty of 
treason for leading an armed band of men whose object was to establish an independ-
ent government); United States v. De Los Reyes, 3 PHIL. REP. 349, 350 (S.C., Feb. 23, 
1904) (acquitting a defendant accused of treason for levying war against the United 
States and the Philippine Islands by serving as a captain in an organization whose ob-
ject was overthrowing the Philippine government). 
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A.  The English and Early American Background 
By the eighteenth century, English law on the subject of levying 
war had developed a high degree of complexity.  At its core, the crime 
clearly included those who “directly rebel against the king, and take 
up arms in order to dethrone him.” 171  But the crime extended even 
more broadly.  A 1768 New York publication gave an apt summary of 
the scope of levying war under English treason law: 
Persons raising forces for any public end or purpose, and putting them-
selves in a posture of war, by choosing leaders, and resisting constables, 
or the guards, etc. is high treason:  and those who make an insurrection 
in order to redress a public grievance, whether it be a real or pretended 
one, are said to levy war against the king, though they have no direct de-
sign against his person.  Where great numbers by force endeavour to 
remove certain persons from the king, or to lay violent hands on a privy 
counselor, or revenge themselves against a magistrate for executing his 
office; or to deliver men out of prison or reform religion or the law, to 
pull down all bawdy-houses, or throw down all inclosures in general, etc. 
these acts will be high treason:  But where a number of men rise to re-
move a grievance to their private interest; as to pull down a particular in-
closure, etc. they are only rioters.
172
This excerpt captures several key points about levying war under Eng-
lish law.  First, an insurrection aimed at a public purpose was treason, 
whereas an insurrection intended to accomplish some private purpose 
was merely a riot.173  Second, levying war against the king includes us-
ing force to accomplish certain acts that lie within the king’s author-
ity.174  As the Chief Justice of New York charged a grand jury in 1726: 
171 HAWKINS, supra note 45, at 37. 
172 EVERY MAN HIS OWN LAWYER 266 (New York, Hugh Gaine 1768). 
173 See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *82 (“[A] tumult with a view to pull 
down a particular house, or lay open a particular inclosure, amounts at most to a riot 
. . . .”); COKE, supra note 19, at 9 (“[I]f three, or four, or more, do rise to burn, or pull 
down an inclosure . . . this or the like is a riot, a rout, or an unlawful assembly, and no 
treason.”); FOSTER, supra note 55, at 209-10 (“[T]hose assemblies so armed and ar-
rayed, if drawn together for purposes of a private nature, were not deemed treasonable 
. . . [but rather as] a riot only.”); HALE, supra note 48, at 131 (“[A] private quarrel . . . 
seems no levying of war against the king.”); HAWKINS, supra note 45, at 37 (“[W]here a 
number of men rise to remove a grievance to their private interest, as to pull down a 
particular inclosure entrenching upon their common, etc., they are only rioters.”). 
174 See, e.g., COKE, supra note 19, at 9 (including “tak[ing] upon the royal author-
ity . . . against the king” within the definition of levying war); HAWKINS, supra note 45, 
at 37 (stating that “[t]hose . . . [who] insolently invade [the king’s] prerogative, by at-
tempting to do that by private authority, which he by public justice ought to do . . . 
manifestly tend[] to a downright rebellion” and a levying of war against the king); 
FOSTER, supra note 55, at 211 (“Insurrections . . . of a public and general concern by an 
armed force, are in construction of law high treason, within the clause of levying war.”); 
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Those who make an insurrection to redress a public grievance, whether 
real or pretended, and of their own authority attempt, with force, to re-
dress it, are said to levy war against the king, though they have no direct 
design against his person, because they insolently invade his prerogative, 
by attempting to do that, by private authority, which he, by public justice, 
ought to do.
175
This theory was occasionally pushed to extremes.  A decision in 
the late seventeenth century had found pulling down all bawdy houses 
an act of levying war, since closing bawdy houses was apparently a pre-
rogative of the king.  Chief Justice Hale refused to join this decision,176 
and one scholar notes that “it is hard to understand why this was trea-
son, rather than riot, unless we let our knowledge of the licentious 
and profligate character of Charles II, then King of England, lead us 
to the conclusion that it was regarded as an attack upon a royal insti-
tution.”177  English law also consistently held that conspiracy to levy 
war was not treason; a conviction could only rest on an actual levying 
of war.178
B.  Levying War and American Law 
1.  Early Authorities 
The Treason Clause itself, of course, does not define the meaning 
of “levying war,” and there is nothing in the debates at the Constitu-
tional Convention shedding any light on the subject.  American au-
thorities prior and subsequent to the ratification of the Constitution 
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *81 (noting that levying war may include taking arms 
“not only to dethrone the king, but under pretense to reform religion, or the laws”). 
175 THE CHARGE GIVEN BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW-YORK TO 
THE GRAND JURY OF THE CITY OF NEW-YORK 12 (New York, John Peter Zenger 1727). 
176 Hale explained his disagreement with the decision in HALE, supra note 48, at 
134-35. 
177 McKinney, supra note 7, at 387. 
178 See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *82 (“A bare conspiracy to levy war 
does not amount to this species of treason.”); FOSTER, supra note 55, at 211 (“[E]very 
conspiracy to levy war for these purposes, [is] not treason within the clause of levying 
war.”); HALE, supra note 48, at 131 (“[A] bare conspiracy or consultations of persons to 
levy a war, and to provide weapons for that purpose . . . is not a levying of war within 
this clause of this statute.”); HAWKINS, supra note 45, at 38 (“[I]t is certain, that a bare 
conspiracy to levy such a war cannot amount to treason unless it be actually levied.”).  
English law nonetheless recognized that a conspiracy to levy war could be considered 
an overt act for a charge of compassing the king’s death.  See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
28, at *82 (“[I]f [the conspiracy is] particularly pointed at the person of the king or his 
government[] it falls within . . . compassing or imagining the king’s death.”). 
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nonetheless closely followed English law in defining the meaning of 
“levying war.”  Chief Justice Thomas McKean of Pennsylvania followed 
English authorities almost verbatim in charges to grand juries in the 
late 1770s.179  In his famous law lectures of 1790, James Wilson pointed 
out that “the term war cannot, in this place, mean such a one as is car-
ried on between independent powers.”180  Accordingly, “[a]ll the curi-
ous and extensive learning . . . concerning the laws of war as carried 
on between separate nations, must be thrown out of this question.”181  
War in this context meant “war as is levied by those who owe obedi-
ence.”182  Wilson’s subsequent analysis relied heavily on the treatises of 
Coke, Hale, Hawkins, Foster, and Blackstone.183  He reiterated that al-
though levying war for some private purpose was not treason within 
the constitutional definition, 
[i]nsurrections in order to throw down all inclosures, to open all prisons, 
to enhance the price of all labour, to expel foreigners in general, or 
those from any single nation living under the protection of government, 
to alter the established law, or to render it ineffectual—insurrections to 
accomplish these ends, by numbers and an open and armed force, are a 
levying of war against the United States.
184
Wilson also noted that the line between treason and an aggravated 
riot “is sometimes very fine and difficult to be distinguished.”185
2.  The Whiskey Rebellion 
In 1794, serious opposition to the federal excise tax broke out in 
western Pennsylvania.  This opposition, known as the “Whiskey Rebel-
lion,” was the first significant internal threat to the authority of the 
new federal government under the Constitution.  After federal troops 
suppressed the rebellion, twenty men were brought to Philadelphia to 
179 See Thomas McKean, Notes of Charges Delivered to Grand Juries by Chief Jus-
tice Thomas McKean, 1777-1779, at 25-27 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania).  In several places in this manuscript, McKean has 
replaced “President of the Supreme Executive Council” with “Governor,” which sug-
gests that he was still using these charges after the adoption of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution of 1790.  For a printed version of a typical charge, see THOMAS MCKEAN, A 
CHARGE DELIVERED TO THE GRAND JURY (Lancaster, Pa., Francis Bailey 1778). 
180 2 WILSON, supra note 34, at 667. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 667-68. 
184 Id. at 668. 
185 Id. 
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stand trial for treason.186  Only two men, John Mitchell and Philip 
Vigol, were ultimately convicted, although both were later pardoned 
by President Washington.187  Supreme Court Justice William Paterson 
presided over the trials.  His charge to the grand jury offered a defini-
tion of levying war that was grounded in English precedents:  “All per-
sons, who rise in rebellion, and take up arms against the government, 
or who in a violent and forcible manner resist and prevent the regular 
administration of justice, and due execution of the laws, come within 
the description of levying war.”188  It was equally treasonous to “make 
insurrections under the pretense of redressing national or public 
grievances” or to “attempt, by intimidation and violence, to force the 
repeal of a law, or an alteration in governmental measures.”189  Pater-
son gave as examples insurrections “with an avowed design to pull 
down all inclosures” or “to open all prisons.”190
Similarly, Justice Paterson’s charge to the petit jury in Mitchell’s 
case concluded that if the object of the insurrection “was to suppress 
the excise offices, and to prevent the execution of an act of Congress, 
by force and intimidation, the offence, in legal estimation, is high 
treason; it is an usurpation of the authority of government; it is high 
treason by levying of war.”191  Justice Paterson thought that the evi-
dence showed this to be the object, and the jury accordingly con-
victed.192
186 THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION:  FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 219 (1986).
187 See CHAPIN, supra note 7, at 87-90 (describing the trial of both men and their 
eventual pardons).  The trials were likely something of an embarrassment to the Wash-
ington administration.  In one case, for example, “[a]fter a long examination of wit-
nesses it was discovered, that the defendant . . . was not the person, liable to the 
charge, but another person of the same name . . . .”  United States v. Porter, 27 F. Cas. 
597, 598 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,073). 
188 William Paterson, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of 
Pennsylvania (May 4, 1795), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 40, 41 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1990) [hereinafter 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 42. 
191 United States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1277, 1281 (Paterson, Circuit Justice, 
C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 15,788). 
192 See id. at 1281-82 for Justice Paterson’s analysis of the evidence and the jury’s 
verdict.  The Vigol prosecution did not involve any significant discussion of levying of 
war.  The defendant was charged with participating in an attack on the home of an ex-
cise officer, forcing the officer to surrender his official papers, and extorting an oath 
from him that he could never again act to enforce the excise tax.  United States v. 
Vigol, 28 F. Cas. 376, 376 (Paterson, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,621).  
These acts are further described in SLAUGHTER, supra note 186, at 150-51, 158.  Justice 
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3.  The Fries Rebellion 
The so-called “Fries Rebellion” of 1799 arose out of opposition to 
a property tax enacted by Congress in 1798.193  Federal tax assessors in 
several Pennsylvania counties encountered significant threats and 
harassment.194  After a federal marshal arrested a number of the pro-
testors, a large armed mob, led by John Fries, confronted the marshal 
and successfully demanded their release.195  Fries and many of his con-
federates were subsequently indicted for treason by levying war against 
the United States.196
Fries’s first trial for treason was held in 1799, with Justice Iredell 
and District Judge Peters presiding.  Justice Iredell’s charge to the 
grand jury stated that if “the intention was to prevent by force of arms 
the execution of any act of the congress of the United States alto-
gether . . . any forcible opposition calculated to carry that intention 
into effect, was a levying of war against the United States.”197  By con-
trast, “if the intention was merely to defeat its operation in a particular 
instance” because of “some private or personal motive,” the defen-
dants’ actions would not amount to treason.198
Fries’s counsel would subsequently argue that English authorities 
should generally carry little weight in America, and offered a different 
Paterson instructed the jury that the evidence showed that the object of the insurrec-
tion was clearly “to render null and void . . . an act of Congress” and that “the crime of 
high treason” was thereby established within the meaning of the Constitution.  Vigol, 28 
F. Cas. at 376.  The jury did not take Justice Paterson as the last word on the law, how-
ever.  In the middle of its deliberations, the jury requested a copy of Foster’s Crown 
Law and Acts of Congress, which the court provided to them.  Id. at 377.  The eight-
eenth-century criminal jury, which the Framers of the Constitution took such pains to 
protect, was obviously a very different institution than its twenty-first-century descen-
dant. 
193 See generally PAUL DOUGLAS NEWMAN, FRIES’S REBELLION:  THE ENDURING 
STRUGGLE FOR THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, at xii (2004) (discussing the impetus for 
rebellion and the resistors’ strong belief in popular sovereignty); Dwight F. Hender-
son, Treason, Sedition, and Fries’ Rebellion, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 308, 309-11 (1970) (de-
scribing citizen resentment of the Direct Tax Act of 1798 and the events leading to re-
bellion); Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges:  Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and the 
Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 26, 83-93 (1978) (discussing 
the background of the Fries Rebellion). 
194 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 193, at 309 (“Assessors were threatened, intimi-
dated, and generally prevented from performing their duty.”). 
195 Id. at 310-11. 
196 Id. at 312. 
197 Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 840 (Iredell, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 
5126). 
198 Id. 
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definition of levying war.199  Under the defense’s view, levying war 
could consist of only three acts:  (1) arraying a body of armed men in 
a martial manner with a view toward ending the existence of govern-
ment; (2) a throwing off of allegiance by one part of the Union from 
the other part; and (3) taking possession of the legislative or executive 
authority by force of arms to compel either of the departments of 
government to act in a particular way.200  This interpretation obviously 
precluded a treason conviction for mere forcible resistance to one 
particular law, even if animated by general, rather than private, con-
cerns. 
Judge Peters’s and Justice Iredell’s charges to the jury pointedly 
rejected the defense’s theory.  As Judge Peters explained, “persons 
who have none but a common interest with their fellow-citizens, to 
oppose or prevent, by force, numbers or intimidation, a public and 
general law of the United States, with intent to prevent its operation, 
or compel its repeal” is treason by levying war.201  Fries was accordingly 
convicted.202  Upon a showing that a juror had uttered statements in-
imical to Fries prior to the trial, however, the court vacated Fries’s 
conviction and ordered a new trial.203
Fries’s second treason trial was held in 1800, this time with Judge 
Peters and Justice Samuel Chase presiding.204  Aware that the defense 
was likely to make arguments similar to those it had made in the first 
trial, the court issued a pretrial opinion on the meaning of levying of 
war.  The opinion noted that although the jury had the ultimate 
power to decide all questions of law and fact, it was the duty of the 
court to offer its opinion on questions of law.205  It explained that “any 
insurrection or rising of any body of people, within the United States, 
to attain or effect, by force or violence, any object of a great public na-
199 See id. at 897 (“As we have enacted laws of our own, and have not extended the 
laws of England to this country, we must put our own construction upon them, and not 
the determination of an English court.”). 
200 Id. at 899. 
201 Id. at 908.  Justice Iredell, on the other hand, argued that the framers of the 
Constitution borrowed terms from British statutes on treason, and that accordingly 
“the English authorities and definition of those terms should be much respected.”  Id. 
at 912. 
202 Id. at 916. 
203 See id. at 916-23 (discussing the motion for a new trial).  The motion is also re-
ported at United States v. Fries, 3 Dall. 515, 518-19 (Iredell, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 
1799). 
204 Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 924, 927-28 (Chase, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1800) 
(No. 5127). 
205 Id. at 943. 
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ture, or of public and general (or national) concern, is a levying war 
against the United States.”206  Moreover, “any such insurrection or ris-
ing to resist or to prevent by force or violence, the execution of any 
statute of the United States . . . is a levying war against the United 
States.”207  The use of “military weapons” was not necessary, as “num-
bers may supply the want of military weapons.”208  Furthermore, the 
“assembling [of] bodies of men, armed and arrayed in a warlike man-
ner, for purposes only of a private nature, is not treason.”209
Since this ruling deprived the defense of its primary argument, 
the defense counsel withdrew from representation, contending that 
the court’s prejudgment of the legal issue was unfair.  Although Chase 
offered to withdraw his opinion, the defense counsel refused to re-
turn, and when Fries refused new counsel, Chase stated that the court 
would act as counsel for the prisoner.210  Fries was convicted again, but 
was subsequently pardoned by President John Adams, against the ad-
vice of Adams’s cabinet.211  Chase’s conduct at the Fries trial was the 
basis for one of the charges against him in his impeachment trial in 
1805.212
4.  The Burr Cases 
The most extensive analysis of “levying war” under American trea-
son law appears in several proceedings concerning the alleged treason 
of former Vice President Aaron Burr.  Burr and his associates were ac-
cused of planning attacks on Spanish Mexico, as well as on cities in 
the Louisiana Territory, with the purpose of revolutionizing the west-
ern United States and separating it from the eastern states.  The ensu-
ing legal proceedings produced several important decisions by Chief 
Justice John Marshall, one in his capacity as Chief Justice of the 
United States, and the rest in his capacity as trial judge in the case 
against Aaron Burr.213
206 Id. at 943-44. 
207 Id. at 944. 
208 Id. 
209 Id.  Justice Chase reiterated all of these points in his charge to the jury.  Id. at 
930. 
210 See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 188, at 404. 
211 Id. 
212 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS:  THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF 
JUSTICES SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 27 (1992). 
213 For a concise overview of the Burr trials, see JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MAR-
SHALL:  DEFINER OF A NATION 352-74 (1996).  Smith notes that Marshall “always con-
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The first decision, Ex parte Bollman, was a habeas petition brought 
by two of Burr’s associates in the Supreme Court of the United States 
to challenge their committal for treason.214  The Court’s opinion es-
tablished two key principles.  First, the Court held, consistent with 
English precedent, that mere conspiracy to levy war is not treason; war 
must actually be levied.215  The Court took pains to point out, how-
ever, that if war is actually levied, all persons who played a role in the 
conspiracy and performed “any part, however minute,” are “to be con-
sidered as traitors.”216  Second, the Court held that it is an essential 
element of levying war that there “be an actual assemblage of men for 
the purpose of executing a treasonable design.”217  Merely enlisting 
men for that purpose would not constitute treason.218  The Court 
never defined “treasonable design,” since it concluded that the design 
of “overturn[ing] the government of the United States in New Or-
leans” was unquestionably treasonable.219  Under these principles, the 
Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to justify a com-
mitment of either man on a charge of treason.220
The other important decisions arose from Marshall’s role as pre-
siding judge in the subsequent trial of Aaron Burr.  Marshall initially 
refused to commit Burr for treason, relying heavily on the reasoning 
in Bollman.  As Marshall explained, “it is equally clear that an intention 
to commit treason is an offence entirely distinct from the actual 
commission of that crime.  War can only be levied by the employment 
of actual force.  Troops must be embodied, men must be assembled, 
in order to levy war.”221  The government subsequently gathered evi-
dence that various men had assembled at Blennerhassett’s Island in 
the Ohio River, allegedly for the purpose of carrying out Burr’s trea-
sonable designs.  This assembly was the overt act upon which Burr’s 
indictment was based.  Burr, however, was several hundred miles from 
sidered the Burr trial to be the most disagreeable experience in his thirty-five years on 
the bench.”  Id. at 374. 
214 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). 
215 See id. at 126 (“However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring . . . such con-
spiracy is not treason.”). 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 127. 
218 See id. (“[N]o conspiracy for this object, no enlisting of men to effect it, would 
be an actual levying of war.”). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 135. 
221 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2, 13 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 
1807) (No. 14,692a). 
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the island, and Burr’s attorneys argued that he could not be convicted 
of treason for actions in which he did not personally participate.222  
Moreover, they argued that the mere assemblage of men was insufficient 
to sustain a treason prosecution.  The issue was argued extensively,223 
and Marshall’s decisions helped clarify certain issues from Bollman. 
Marshall’s grand jury charge distinguished between a conspiracy 
to levy war and an actual levying of war: 
Any combination to subvert by force the government of the United 
States, violently to dismember the Union, to compel a change in the 
administration, to coerce the repeal or adoption of a general law, is a 
conspiracy to levy war; and if the conspiracy be carried into effect by the 
actual employment of force, by the embodying and assembling of men 
for the purpose of executing the treasonable design which was previously 
conceived, it amounts to levying of war.
224
Later in the trial, Marshall emphasized again that the crime of “levy-
ing war” required the gathering of some sort of force, which would 
usually consist of the gathering of men.225  Such force need not neces-
sarily be applied to a particular violent end, nor must the men neces-
sarily be armed.  Marshall argued that “[i]f a rebel army, avowing its 
hostility to the sovereign power . . . should march and countermarch 
before it . . . then disperse . . . without firing a gun,” the marchers 
were clearly guilty of “levying war.”226  Similarly, “[i]f the party be in a 
condition to execute the purposed treason without the usual imple-
ments of war,” Marshall could “perceive no reason for requiring those 
implements in order to constitute the crime.”227  Nonetheless, to levy 
war there had to be at least some “employment and exhibition of 
force.”228  Marshall took pains to explain that Bollman’s requirement of 
an assemblage of men did not mean that a mere assemblage of men is 
sufficient; rather, the assemblage had to contain some element of 
222 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 116 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 
1807) (No. 14,693). 
223 See id. at 116-59. 
224 Id. at 168-69 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
225 See id. at 162 (“[The treasonous] character [of prior cases] was unequivocal, 
and was demonstrated by evidence furnished by the assemblage itself. . . . A force is 
supposed to be collected for an avowed treasonable object, in a condition to attempt 
that object, and to have commenced the attempt by moving towards it.”). 
226 Id. at 162. 
227 Id. 
228 Id.; see also id. at 163-65 (citing English and American authorities to the same 
effect). 
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force.229  A “secret, unarmed meeting” was simply insufficient.230  Mar-
shall also explained why an assemblage of men and a show of force 
was required.  He asked, “Why is it that a single armed individual en-
tering a boat, and sailing down the Ohio for the avowed purpose of 
attacking New Orleans, could not be said to levy war?”231  Marshall’s 
answer was that such a person “is apparently not in a condition to levy 
war.”232  If this is true, then “ought not the assemblage to furnish some 
evidence of its intention and capacity to levy war before it can amount 
to levying war?”233  In 1807, of course, only an assemblage of men 
could wield significant force. 
Marshall further held that in the absence of any evidence that 
Burr procured the assembly of men on Blennerhassett’s Island, the 
government had to prove an actual overt act on Burr’s part showing 
actual levying of war.  That act, “may be minute, it may not be the ac-
tual appearance in arms, and it may be remote from the scene of ac-
tion . . . but it must be a part, and that part must be performed by a 
person who is leagued in the conspiracy.”234
5.  Subsequent American Decisions 
With a few isolated exceptions, the issue of treason by levying war 
almost entirely disappeared from American jurisprudence after the 
Burr trial.  In 1808, a Vermonter was indicted for treason for forcibly 
removing a wooden raft from the custody of military guards assisting a 
federal revenue collector in the enforcement of the Embargo Act.235  
Justice Henry Livingston’s charge to the jury, relying on the opinions 
in the Whiskey Rebellion and Fries cases, all but directed an acquit-
tal.236  Justice Livingston stated that the defendant’s conduct was 
clearly of a private nature and that there was a significant difference 
between a true levying of war and a “sudden, transient, weak, unmili-
229 See id. at 168 (“[A]lthough the terms force and violence are not employed [by 
the Supreme Court] as descriptions of the assemblage, such requisites are declared to 
be indispensable as can scarcely exist without the appearance of war and the existence 
of real force.”). 
230 Id. at 168. 
231 Id. at 169. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 177. 
235 United States v. Hoxie, 26 F. Cas. 397 (Livingston, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Vt. 
1808) (No. 15,407). 
236 Id. at 399-400. 
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tary, and unsystematized resistance, and that in a solitary instance, and 
for the single object of personal emolument.”237
In 1842, Justice Joseph Story defined “levying war” in a charge to a 
federal grand jury in Rhode Island.  Story explained: 
To constitute an actual levy of war, there must be an assembly of persons, 
met for the treasonable purpose, and some overt act done, or some at-
tempt made by them with force to execute, or towards executing, that 
purpose. There must be a present intention to proceed in the execution 
of the treasonable purpose by force.
238
An actual assault on the institutions of government was not required: 
If the assembly is arrayed in a military manner, if they are armed and 
march in a military form, for the express purpose of overawing or in-
timidating the public, and thus they attempt to carry into effect the trea-
sonable design, that will, of itself, amount to a levy of war, although no 
actual blow has been struck, or engagement has taken place.
239
Story also elaborated on the meaning of “treasonable purpose.”  He em-
phasized that it was not necessary that “it should be a direct and positive 
intention entirely to subvert or overthrow the government.”240  It was 
also treason “by force to prevent the execution of any one or more gen-
eral and public laws of the government, or to resist the exercise of any 
legitimate authority of the government in its sovereign capacity.”241
237 Id. at 400.  Similarly, in 1851 Justice Grier presided over a federal trial regard-
ing a charge of treason for resisting individuals seeking to recover fugitive slaves pur-
suant to the Fugitive Slave Act.  He charged the jury that he did “not think the transac-
tion with which the prisoner is charged . . . rises to the dignity of treason or a levying of 
war.”  United States v. Hanway, 26 F. Cas. 105, 128 (Grier, Circuit Justice, C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1851) (No. 15,299).  “[T]he object of the resistance must be of a public and general 
nature.”  Id.  There was no evidence of a “previous conspiracy to make a general and 
public resistance to any law of the United States” and “no evidence that any person 
concerned in the transaction knew there were such acts of congress.”  Id.  The defen-
dant was acquitted.  Id. at 129. 
238 Charge to the Grand Jury—Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1046, 1047 (Story, Circuit Jus-
tice, C.C.D.R.I. 1842) (No. 18,275). 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Id.  In 1844, Thomas Wilson Dorr was tried and convicted for treason by the 
state of Rhode Island for his role in leading the so-called “Dorr Rebellion.”  One of 
Dorr’s arguments in defense was that he was acting as governor of the state under the 
“People’s Constitution,” and therefore lacked the necessary criminal intent to commit 
treason.  See The Trial of Thomas Wilson Dorr for Treason, Rhode Island, 1844, in 2 AMERI-
CAN STATE TRIALS 5, 117-18, 120 ( John D. Lawson ed., 1914).  The presiding judge re-
lied verbatim on Justice Story’s federal grand jury charge for the definition of levying 
war.  See id. at 157-58. 
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A 1911 Nevada statute explicitly defined “levying war” for pur-
poses of the state’s treason law.  This appears to be the only statutory 
definition of “levying war” in an American jurisdiction.  Under the 
statute, 
[w]hen persons arise in insurrection with intent to prevent, in general, 
by force and intimidation, the execution of a statute of this state, or to 
force its repeal, they shall be guilty of levying war.  But an endeavor, al-
though by numbers and force of arms, to resist the execution of a law in 
a single instance, and for a private purpose, is not levying war.
242
C.  Terrorism and Levying War 
The historical material recounted above poses a most difficult 
question:  what is the current state of the law governing treason by 
levying war?  In 1945, the leading American treason scholar, James 
Willard Hurst, argued that “the crime of treason by levying war has 
been restricted here . . . to the offense described by the literal mean-
ing of the words:  a direct effort to overthrow the government, or 
wholly to supplant its authority in some part or all of its territory.”243  
Specifically, Hurst believed there was no longer any vitality to the 
crime of treason by forcible resistance to particular laws.244  Hurst rea-
soned that the lack of prosecutions, despite such disturbances as “the 
railroad strikes of 1877, the Haymarket affair of 1886, Coxey’s Army, 
and the Pullman strike in 1894,”245 showed that this area of law had 
“become obsolete by nonuse and by critical reaction against it at the 
bar and in the courts.”246  Hurst’s examples, however, do not convinc-
ingly prove his case, and it may be that clear instances of this form of 
treason simply have not occurred.  Significantly, there is no American 
decision explicitly rejecting the view that forcible resistance to a par-
ticular law for public purposes is treason by levying war. 
Resolution of this troublesome issue, however, is probably not 
necessary for most cases related to terrorism.  Violent attacks of the 
sort that the United States experienced on September 11 are not di-
rected at resisting one particular law; they contemplate the destruc-
242 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 196.020 (LexisNexis 2001). 
243 Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States (pt. 3), 58 HARV. L. REV. 806, 822-23 
(1945). 
244 HURST, supra note 6, at ix. 
245 Hurst, supra note 243, at 822. 
246 HURST, supra note 6, at ix. 
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tion and incapacitation of the entire United States government.247  
The attack on the Pentagon and the potential attack on the Capitol or 
the White House present the easiest case for a finding of levying war.  
The terrorists assembled men and employed force directly against the 
United States government for public purposes.  Indeed, if such attacks 
did not constitute levying war against the United States, it is hard to 
imagine what would.  Even if the terrorists had attacked only the 
World Trade Center, however, their avowed purpose of altering the 
policies of the United States government248 would render their con-
duct treasonous.  This connection between treason and terrorism was 
explicitly recognized in United States v. Rahman, an appeal of convic-
tions for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.249  The Second Cir-
cuit unanimously upheld the trial judge’s application of the treason 
sentencing guideline, which provided the base offense level for “con-
duct [that] is tantamount to waging war against the United States.”250  
As the court explained, “The evidence established that each defen-
dant joined either the plot that resulted in the bombing of the World 
Trade Center or the plot to bomb major New York City tunnels and 
bridges . . . . Such activity . . . could not be found to be other than 
conduct ‘tantamount to waging war.’”251  Under this view, Timothy 
McVeigh’s 1995 assault on the federal building in Oklahoma City was 
also an act of treason by levying war against the United States. 
The terrorist threats posed by modern technology also require re-
consideration of Chief Justice Marshall’s conclusion that a lone indi-
vidual could not levy war.  A solo pilot of a cargo plane wields the 
force of thousands of eighteenth-century men; an individual armed 
with a nuclear weapon wields the force of millions more.  Such a per-
son is in a position to deliver a single devastating blow to the opera-
tions of the United States government, a power no individual ever 
could have wielded prior to the twentieth century.  Under any func-
tional account of the law, such a person can be said to levy war against 
247 See YORAM SCHWEITZER & SAUL SHAY, THE GLOBALIZATION OF TERROR:  THE 
CHALLENGE OF AL-QAIDA AND THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 32 
(2003) (“The chain of terror activities initiated by Bin-Laden was designed to deliver a 
strategic blow of terror that would significantly cripple the status and influence of the 
United States.”). 
248 See id. at 138 (proposing that one of the goals of the September 11 attack was to 
drag the United States into a war against the entire Muslim world). 
249 189 F.3d 88, 103 (2d Cir. 1999). 
250 Id. at 154 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2M1.1(a)(1) 
(1998)). 
251 Id. 
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the United States; it would strain all credulity to assert, for example, 
that there must be at least two people in the cockpit of the plane in 
order for war to be levied. 
Far from deviating from traditional understandings of levying war, 
many terrorist acts accordingly fit well within its meaning.  Indeed, the 
larger and more horrific the terrorist action, the more likely that it 
will constitute an act of levying war.  As such, it is very hard to argue 
that terrorism represents a significant exception to the ordinary 
criminal law paradigm.  The worst terrorists are traitors, and should 
be punished as such. 
Mere conspiracy to levy war, however, is not treason.  Such con-
spiracies are governed instead by the federal statute prohibiting sedi-
tious conspiracies.252  To advance from a conspiracy to an actual levy-
ing of war, there must be some overt act and some show of force.  
Depending on the nature of the conspiracy, however, and the pre-
paratory actions taken, it may be possible to show that a terrorist con-
spiracy constitutes treason by adhering to the enemies of the United 
States.  It is to that subject that I now turn. 
IV.  ARE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS “ENEMIES?” 
The Treason Clause’s second definition of treason focuses on 
enemies:  “Treason against the United States, shall consist . . . 
in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”253  This 
definition raises two significant questions.  First, what exactly does it 
mean to be an “enemy,” and might certain terrorist organizations hos-
tile to the United States be “enemies” under this provision?  Second, 
regardless of how the term is to be defined, which institution of gov-
ernment is entrusted with that determination?  Is this essentially a po-
litical question that is entrusted to the legislative and executive 
branches, or is it a question that courts can attempt to answer? 
In Section A, I examine the English precedents interpreting the 
term “enemies” as well as the handful of American decisions that have 
addressed it.  I conclude that certain terrorist organizations such as Al 
Qaeda can be considered “enemies” within the meaning of the Trea-
252 See 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (2000) (defining as seditious conspiracy acts by “two or 
more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States, [to] conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or to levy war against them”); see also Rahman, 189 F.3d 
at 111-14 (distinguishing seditious conspiracy under the federal statute from treason 
under the Constitution). 
253 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
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son Clause.  In Section B, I address the separate question of institu-
tional competence.  I conclude that courts have an important supervi-
sory role to play with respect to this issue, but that substantial defer-
ence is owed to the legislative and executive branches. 
A.  The Definition of “Enemies” 
Unlike the term “war,” which is peppered throughout the Consti-
tution,254 the term “enemies” appears only in the Treason Clause and 
in Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which substantially tracks 
the Treason Clause.255  As with the levying war provision, however, the 
adhering-to-enemies provision is taken directly from the English stat-
ute of 25 Edward III.256  It is therefore instructive to examine the 
meaning of the term “enemies” under English law as it was under-
stood at the time of the ratification of the Constitution.  The following 
broad propositions were largely undisputed. 
First, the enemies provision served as the foreign counterpart to 
the levying war provision, and the two provisions define, respectively, 
external and internal treason.  Accordingly, English subjects could 
never be enemies under 25 Edward III, even if they were engaged in 
open rebellion against the king.  As Coke explained, “Inimicus in legal 
understanding is hostis, for the subjects of the king, though they be in 
open war or rebellion against the king, yet are they not the king’s 
enemies, but traitors; for enemies be those that be out of the alle-
giance of the king.”257  Or, as Blackstone put it, an enemy is “always 
the subject of some foreign pri[n]ce, and one who owes no allegiance 
to the crown of England.”258  A 1768 American edition of an English 
treatise summarized the law thusly: 
254 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating the congressional power “[t]o de-
clare War”). 
255 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3 (“No person shall . . . hold any office, civil or 
military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, . . . shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid 
or comfort to the enemies thereof.”). 
256 See Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2 (declaring it to be treasonous “if a 
man do levy war against our lord the king in his realm, or be adherent to the king’s 
enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere”). 
257 COKE, supra note 19, at 11 (italics added). 
258 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *83; see also HALE, supra note 48, at 159 (stat-
ing that only foreigners “come properly under the name of enemies”); HAWKINS, supra 
note 45, at 38 (linking enemies to “aliens in open hostility against the king” and noting 
that “a rebel is not properly an enemy”). 
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Subjects of the king, in open war, or rebellion, are not the king’s ene-
mies, but traitors; and if a subject join with a foreign enemy, and come 
into England with him; if he be taken prisoner, he shall not be ran-
somed, or proceeded against as an enemy, but as a traitor to the king:  
but an enemy coming in open hostility into this kingdom and taken, 
shall be either executed by martial law, or ransomed; for he cannot be 
indicted of treason, because he never was within the allegiance of the 
king.
259
Second, “enemies” was not limited only to those foreign states 
against which England had declared war.  Courts looked to the fact of 
actual hostility, not to formalities.260  Foster concluded, “[s]tates in ac-
tual hostility with us, though no war be solemnly declared, are ene-
mies within the meaning of the Act.”261
Third, “enemies” was not limited to states, and could include 
rogue groups of individuals with hostile designs against England.  The 
classic example was a foreigner who attacked England on his own ini-
tiative, notwithstanding peaceful relations between his country and 
England.  “[I]f the subject of a foreign prince in amity with us invades 
the kingdom without commission from his sovereign,” Foster ex-
plained, “he is an enemy.”262  Similarly, as Blackstone noted, “foreign 
pirates or robbers, who may happen to invade our coasts, without any 
open hostilities between their nation and our own” are properly classi-
fied as enemies under the treason statute.263
Although the evidence is limited, these English definitions appear 
to have been widely accepted in late eighteenth-century America.  In 
the late 1770s, Chief Justice Thomas McKean of Pennsylvania inter-
preted the term “enemies” in his state’s treason law in accordance 
with English precedents: 
259 EVERY MAN HIS OWN LAWYER, supra note 172, at 266-67 (emphasis omitted).  
Similarly, a 1787 New York edition of Vattel’s famous treatise on international law as-
serted that deserters to the enemy “are not properly considered as enemies, and are 
rather perfidious citizens, traitors to their country, and this quality, their enlisting with 
the enemy cannot obliterate, nor exempt them from the punishment they have de-
served.”  VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (New York, Berry & Roger 1787). 
260 See, e.g., HALE, supra note 48, at 162 (“[I]f de facto there be a war between 
princes, they and their subjects are in a state of hostility and they are in the condition 
of enemies . . . to each other . . . .”). 
261 FOSTER, supra note 55, at 219; see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *83 (stat-
ing that an enemy is always “one who owes no allegiance to the crown of England”). 
262 FOSTER, supra note 55, at 219. 
263 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *83; see also HALE, supra note 48, at 164 
(“[E]nemy extends farther than a king or state in enmity, [and includes] an alien com-
ing into England in hostility.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 
2006] THE FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF TREASON 917 
 
States in actual hostility with the United States of America, though no 
war be solemnly declared, are enemies within the meaning of this Act.  
And if the subject of any foreign prince in amity with us invades any of 
these United States, without commission from his sovereign, he is an en-
emy.  Or if an alien army acts in a hostile manner against us, under a 
commission from a prince or state at enmity with us, he is an enemy.  
And aiding or assisting either of them is treason within this clause.
264
In his law lectures of 1790, James Wilson, citing Foster, similarly ob-
served that “the subjects or citizens of such states or princes, in actual 
hostility, though no war be solemnly declared, are . . . enemies.”265
In 1798, Attorney General Charles Lee analyzed the deteriorating 
relationship between the United States and France. Although no for-
mal declaration of war had issued, he concluded in a formal opinion 
that there existed an actual maritime war, authorized by the govern-
ments of both nations.266  Accordingly, he reasoned, “France is our 
enemy; and to aid, assist, and abet that nation in her maritime war-
fare, will be treason in a citizen or any other person within the United 
States not commissioned under France.”267  Lee observed that there 
were reports of a Frenchman somewhere in the United States who was 
buying ships and supplies for French use in the West Indies.268  This 
individual, Lee recommended, “should be apprehended and tried as a 
traitor, unless he has a commission, and acts according to it; in which 
case he should be treated as an enemy, and confined as a prisoner of 
war.”269
Subsequent American decisions squarely addressing the meaning 
of the term “enemies” in the context of the Treason Clause are ex-
tremely rare.270  Nonetheless, there is little reason to believe that 
264 McKean, supra note 179, at 29. 
265 2 WILSON, supra note 34, at 668. 
266 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 84, 84 (1798). 
267 Id. 
268 Id. at 85. 
269 Id. 
270 A consistent line of cases holds that a United States citizen who remains in en-
emy territory after the initiation of hostilities may be treated as an enemy, at least inso-
far as seizure of his property by the military in wartime is concerned.  See, e.g., Juragua 
Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297, 306 (1909) (“The plaintiff, although an Ameri-
can corporation, doing business in Cuba, was, during the war with Spain, to be deemed 
an enemy to the United States with respect of its property found and then used in that 
country . . . .”); Gates v. Goodloe, 101 U.S. 612, 617 (1880) (“When [R.C. Brinkley] 
abandoned his home, and entered the military lines of the enemy, he was, beyond 
question, . . . an enemy of the government . . . liable to be treated as such both to his 
person and property.”); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 305-06 (1871) 
(“It is immaterial to it whether the owner [of the confiscated property] be an alien or a 
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American law has departed in any significant respect from this early 
understanding of the term.271  Our view of the law, however, can be 
easily obscured by overhasty readings of the Supreme Court’s exten-
sive discussion of the term “enemies” in The Prize Cases.272  These cases 
concerned the Union blockade of Confederate ports, the legality of 
which depended upon the Confederacy’s status as a belligerent under 
principles of international law.  As the Court explained, “[w]hen the 
party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain por-
tion of territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their 
allegiance; have organized armies; have commenced hostilities against 
their former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerents, 
and the contest a war.”273  The parties to a civil war “usually concede to 
each other belligerent rights.  They exchange prisoners, and adopt 
the other courtesies and rules common to public or national wars.”274  
The specific question before the Court was whether President Lincoln 
could unilaterally recognize a state of war with the Confederacy absent 
congressional action.275  In the course of the argument, however, 
counsel for the claimants asserted that the Confederacy, at least in the 
early stages of the Civil War, was not entitled to belligerent status un-
der any circumstances, since the events constituted only an insurrec-
tion, not a war.276  The Court held that the “law of nations . . . contains 
no such anomalous doctrine.”277  It was inconceivable that 
insurgents who have risen in rebellion against their sovereign, expelled 
her Courts, established a revolutionary government, organized armies, 
friend . . . . In either case the property may be liable to confiscation under the rules of 
war.”); The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 286 (1814) (noting that a citizen’s property 
may be condemned in the midst of hostilities if that citizen was a “belligerent” at the 
time of the condemnation).  These cases, however, have rested on general interna-
tional law principles and not on the Treason Clause.  Other cases have interpreted the 
term “enemy” as defined in the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. App. § 
2 (2000). 
271 See, e.g., Martin v. Young, 134 F. Supp. 204, 207 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (suggesting 
that North Korea, although not the subject of a declaration of war, was an enemy for 
purposes of the federal treason statute). 
272 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
273 Id. at 666-67; see generally Yair M. Lootsteen, The Concept of Belligerency in Interna-
tional Law, 166 MIL. L. REV. 109 (2000) (discussing the application of concepts of bel-
ligerency to armed conflicts under international law and the significance of holding 
territory).  For a cogent analysis of constitutional issues raised by the Civil War, see 
DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION (2003). 
274 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 667. 
275 Id. at 665. 
276 Id. at 642-43 (argument of Attorney Carlisle). 
277 Id. at 670. 
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and commenced hostilities, are not enemies because they are traitors; and 
a war levied on the Government by traitors, in order to dismember and 
destroy it, is not a war because it is an “insurrection.”
278
Having established the legality of the blockade, the Court turned 
to the meaning of the term “enemies’ property” under the law of 
war.279  The Court noted that the claimants, relying on common law, 
“contend that the term ‘enemy’ is properly applicable to those only 
who are subjects or citizens of a foreign state at war with our own.”280  
Such an argument, the Court held, was entirely inconsistent with the 
concept of belligerency under international law.  The claimant’s 
proposition suggested that the Confederacy could exercise belligerent 
rights against the Union, but that the Union could not do so against 
the Confederacy.281  Under international law, enemies’ property was 
subject to capture; here, the Confederate rebels had “cast off their al-
legiance and made war on their Government, and are none the less 
enemies because they are traitors.”282
The Court’s willingness to twice equate “enemies” with “traitors” 
might suggest an abandonment of the traditional distinction under 
treason law between “enemies” and “traitors.”  Such an interpretation 
of The Prize Cases, however, is unwarranted.  First, the Court was care-
ful to explain that its holding rested on principles of international law, 
and, in particular, on principles uniquely applicable to admiralty ju-
risdiction.  As the Court explained, “in defining the meaning of the 
term ‘enemies’ property,’ we will be led into error if we refer to Fleta 
and Lord Coke. . . . It is a technical phrase peculiar to prize courts, 
and depends upon principles of public policy as distinguished from 
the common law.”283  Second, the Court’s reasoning must be read in 
light of the sweeping argument offered by the claimants, which sought 
to apply treason law principles in a manner that would eliminate the 
power of parties to a civil war to recognize the traditional status of bel-
ligerency.  Third, seven months after The Prize Cases were decided, Jus-
tice Stephen Field followed traditional treason law principles when in-
structing a jury on circuit, stating: 
The term “enemies,” as used in the second clause [of the Treason 
Clause], according to its settled meaning, at the time the constitution 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at 671. 
280 Id. at 672. 
281 Id. at 673. 
282 Id. at 674. 
283 Id. 
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was adopted, applies only to the subjects of a foreign power in a state of 
open hostility with us.  It does not embrace rebels in insurrection against 
their own government.  An enemy is always the subject of a foreign 
power who owes no allegiance to our government or country.
284
Surely if The Prize Cases constituted a major innovation in treason law, 
Justice Field would have noted that.  Rather, his restatement of tradi-
tional principles indicates that the term “enemies” in the Constitution 
retains its widespread and traditional meaning. 
The foregoing authorities suggest that Al Qaeda and possibly 
other terrorist groups might constitute “enemies” within the meaning 
of the Treason Clause.  The most apt analogy is between Al Qaeda and 
the “pirates and robbers” that Blackstone recognized as “enemies” 
under English treason law.  And just as a rogue French nobleman with 
independent designs to attack England would constitute an enemy of 
England, a rogue Saudi millionaire with plans to attack the United 
States is an enemy of the United States.  There can be no doubt that 
Al Qaeda has engaged in violent, war-like attacks on the United States.  
In this regard, Al Qaeda differs significantly from the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War period.  The Soviet Union was never an “enemy” 
of the United States under the Treason Clause because it was never at 
open war with the United States.  Accordingly, persons who allegedly 
spied for the Soviet Union, such as Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, were 
convicted of espionage, not treason.285
B.  By Whom and How Should Enemy Status Be Determined? 
If foreign terrorist organizations may constitute “enemies” under 
the Treason Clause, the next question is, who gets to make this de-
termination?  The issue is likely to arise in the following way:  the fed-
eral government indicts an individual for treason on the basis of pro-
viding aid and comfort to a foreign terrorist group, and the defendant 
moves to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the terrorist or-
ganization is not an “enemy” within the meaning of the Treason 
Clause. 
There is a significant argument that such a determination poses a 
nonreviewable political question.  As a practical matter, declaring a 
284 United States v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18, 22 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.N.D. 
Cal. 1863) (No. 15,254). 
285 See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 588-90 (2d Cir. 1952) (discussing 
the grand jury indictment and conviction of the Rosenbergs for violating the Espio-
nage Act). 
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nation or a group to be an “enemy” is tantamount to a declaration of 
war.  Such a determination therefore raises thorny questions of for-
eign relations that the text of the Constitution squarely commits to 
the political branches.286  The Supreme Court has emphasized that 
such questions of foreign affairs are particularly inappropriate for ju-
dicial resolution,287 and it seems at minimum unseemly for courts to 
interfere with such determinations.  Although there appear to be no 
American decisions addressing this issue in the context of the Treason 
Clause, there are several instructive decisions in other contexts.  In 
The Prize Cases, the Supreme Court held that the question of whether a 
rebellion was of sufficient magnitude to justify recognition of belliger-
ent status was “a question to be decided by [the President], and this 
Court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political de-
partment of the Government to which this power was entrusted.”288  
President Lincoln’s proclamation of the blockade was “official and 
conclusive evidence to the Court that a state of war existed.”289  A 
slightly earlier district court case had held, “In a legal sense, the state 
of war or peace is not a question in pais for courts to determine.  It is 
a legal fact ascertainable only from the decision of the political de-
partment.”290  Both decisions suggest that, as an evidentiary matter, 
the existence of a state of war is a matter of judicial notice of the ac-
tions of the political branches, an idea that subsequent lower court 
decisions have explicitly embraced.291  These decisions have empha-
286 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting, among the potential rea-
sons for determining an issue to be a “political question,” the possibility of “a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political de-
partment”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power “[t]o 
declare War”). 
287 See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (“The conduct of the 
foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive 
and Legislative—‘the political’—Departments of the Government, and the propriety of 
what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial in-
quiry or decision.”). 
288 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863). 
289 Id. 
290 United States v. One Hundred & Twenty-Nine Packages, 27 F. Cas. 284, 289 
(E.D. Mo. 1862) (No. 15,941). 
291 See, e.g., Grewe v. France, 75 F. Supp. 433, 437 (E.D. Wis. 1948) (“This court will 
take judicial notice of the fact that in June and July, 1946, a state of war existed be-
tween this nation and that of Germany . . . .”); United States v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 
18, 23 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863) (No. 15,524) (“The existence of the 
rebellion is a matter of public notoriety, and . . . may be taken notice of by judges and 
juries . . . . The public notoriety, the proclamations of the president, and the acts of 
congress are sufficient proof of the allegation of the indictment in this respect.”). 
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sized that “there must be some determination by the political depart-
ment of the government evidencing the existence of” a state of war.292  
As one court explained, “[u]ntil some recognition by the political de-
partment, express, implied, or tacit, of new conditions in foreign 
states, there is no ‘open war,’ no ‘belligerent;’ there are no ‘enemies’ 
that the court can recognize, but only insurgents.”293
Although these decisions might suggest that the determination of 
“enemy” status is completely unreviewable by courts, such an argu-
ment must certainly fail, at least with respect to the Treason Clause.  A 
court surely can and must dismiss a treason indictment if the asserted 
“enemy” was the Democratic Party or the Sierra Club or the Chicago 
Tribune.  Indeed, the location of the Treason Clause in Article III is 
strong evidence that the clause is a directive to the judicial branch to 
review treason indictments and prosecutions carefully to guard against 
executive abuse.  If a defendant were precluded from arguing that the 
alleged “enemy” isn’t anything of the sort, the protective safeguards of 
the Treason Clause could be easily evaded.  The problem, though, 
perhaps peculiar to the law of treason, is to fashion a standard that is 
protective of defendants while not unduly interfering with the politi-
cal branches’ conduct of foreign affairs. 
292 Verano v. De Angelis Coal Co., 41 F. Supp. 954, 955 (M.D. Pa. 1941) (holding 
that there was no state of war between the United States and Italy); see also Semmes v. 
City Fire Ins. Co., 21 F. Cas. 1051, 1054 (C.C.D. Conn. 1869) (No. 12,651) (“It is a set-
tled rule with the courts of the United States, in ascertaining whether or not war exists, 
to look to the action of those departments of the government to which that subject is 
confided by the constitution.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Semmes v. Hartford Ins. 
Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 158 (1871); cf. Langlas v. Iowa Life Ins. Co., 63 N.W.2d 885, 889 
(Iowa 1954) (“[W]ar is a fact, not dependent upon the formal declaration of Con-
gress.”); La Rue v. Kan. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 75 P. 494, 496 (Kan. 1904) (taking judicial 
notice of the insurrection in the Philippine Islands as a “fact in history”); Dole v. Mer-
chants’ Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 51 Me. 465, 470 (1863) (“War is an existing fact, and not 
a legislative decree. . . . [I]t is the fact that makes ‘enemies,’ and not any legislative 
Act.”).  But see Pang v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 37 Haw. 208, 216, 222 (1945) 
(holding that the attack on Pearl Harbor, although an act of war, did not create a state 
of war under the terms of a life insurance policy). 
293 The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).  Similar reasoning likely 
applies to the recognition of the conclusion of hostilities.  As the Supreme Court put it 
in 1948, “[w]hether and when it would be open to this Court to find that a war though 
merely formally kept alive had in fact ended, is a question too fraught with gravity even 
to be adequately formulated when not compelled.”  Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 
169 (1948); cf. Ex parte Arakawa, 79 F. Supp. 468, 470-71 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (holding that 
the Axis powers’ unconditional surrender and the President’s proclamation of cessa-
tion of hostilities did not terminate the state of war). 
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At minimum, the Treason Clause would seem to demand review 
of two issues:  (1) whether the asserted “enemy” at least conforms to 
the traditional requirement that an “enemy” have no allegiance to the 
United States; and (2) whether the assertion is supported by other ac-
tions of the political departments.  As a basic matter of due process, 
individuals should have some sort of notice as to what groups will be 
considered enemies for purposes of the Treason Clause.  The declara-
tion of enemy status cannot come in the indictment itself.  By limiting 
judicial inquiry to these two narrow questions, the traditional preroga-
tives of the political branches over foreign affairs would be main-
tained, while at the same time preserving the protective purposes of 
the Treason Clause.294
C.  Al Qaeda as Enemy 
If the foregoing analysis is correct, can terrorist organizations cur-
rently be recognized as “enemies” under the Treason Clause?  With 
respect to Al Qaeda, the answer is likely yes.  Shortly after the Septem-
ber 11 attacks, Congress passed an act authorizing the President “to 
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organi-
zations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons.”295  Congress further asserted 
that “such [terrorist] acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordi-
nary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United 
States.”296  This resolution clearly singles out any group responsible for 
the September 11 attacks as the appropriate target of full-scale mili-
tary force and contemplates action by the United States armed 
forces.297  A forceful argument can therefore be made that the politi-
cal branches have identified the perpetrators of the September 11 at-
tacks as public enemies of the United States.  The argument would be 
stronger, of course, if Congress had specifically used the word “ene-
294 Cf. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909) (holding that the Colorado Gov-
ernor was not liable for damages for detaining an individual after declaring a county to 
be in a state of insurrection so long as he acted in good faith and with the honest belief 
that the actions were necessary). 
295 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001). 
296 Id.  For an analysis of this legislation, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown 
Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 250-57 (2002). 
297 Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War 
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2107-16 (2005) (discussing who may be consid-
ered an “enemy” under the resolution). 
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mies.”  Were Congress to do so, it would be nearly impossible for a 
court to hold that Al Qaeda is not an enemy for purposes of the Trea-
son Clause.298
It should be noted that such a decision to declare Al Qaeda an 
enemy may have repercussions for the federal statutes prohibiting the 
provision of material support to a terrorist organization.299  If Al 
Qaeda is an enemy, the Treason Clause may preclude prosecution 
under the terrorist support statutes, because the elements of the 
crime would be identical with that of adhering to the enemies of the 
United States by giving them aid and comfort.  An individual prose-
cuted under these statutes would have a valid defense that the terror-
ist organization allegedly aided was in fact an “enemy” under the 
Treason Clause.300  Such a defense would force the government to ei-
ther abandon the material support prosecution or concede that Al 
Qaeda is not an “enemy.” 
This analysis also suggests that someone who aided Al Qaeda prior 
to September 11 could not be indicted for treason by adhering to 
enemies,301 although depending upon the level of involvement in the 
plot, could be susceptible to a charge of treason by levying war.  With 
respect to other terrorist organizations, the argument for “enemy” 
status is much more doubtful.  These organizations have not been 
specifically singled out for the use of military force by Congress, and 
any treason prosecution for assisting such organizations would raise 
troublesome issues of notice and due process. 
Traditional treason law principles, in short, support viewing cer-
tain terrorist groups as enemies of the United States.  As with levying 
298 The potential power of the President to recognize “enemy” status unilaterally is 
an issue that raises complex questions of presidential war power vis-à-vis Congress that 
are far beyond the scope of this Article. 
299 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339A-2339B (2000) (making it a criminal offense to pro-
vide material support of resources to terrorist groups).  For a thorough analysis of 
these laws, see generally Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario:  Terrorism-Support Laws 
and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2005). 
300 Cf. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945) (suggesting “that Congress 
could [not] dispense with the two-witness rule merely by giving the same offense an-
other name”). 
301 The requirement of prior open recognition of enemy status was recognized 
under English law.  As Foster explained, 
[t]he offence of inciting foreigners to invade the kingdom is a treason of sig-
nal enormity. . . . And yet, unless the powers so incited happen to be actually 
at war with us at the time of such incitement, the offence will not fall within 
any branch of the Statute of Treasons, except that of compassing the king’s 
death. 
FOSTER, supra note 55, at 196-97. 
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war, there is therefore little reason to think that terrorist groups pose 
such a distinctive and unique threat as to warrant departure from the 
ordinary criminal law paradigm. 
CONCLUSION 
The title of this Article refers to “the forgotten constitutional law 
of treason.”  As I suggested in the Introduction, the sources and issues 
recounted in this Article are likely unfamiliar to most lawyers and 
scholars.  Yet the Treason Clause forms an important part of Ameri-
can constitutional law.  Through the Treason Clause, the Framers con-
firmed the long-standing practice in Anglo-American law of distin-
guishing between persons subject to the law of treason and persons 
subject to military authority, a practice now seriously eroded by the 
Supreme Court’s ratification of the Quirin error in Hamdi.  This lesson 
is particularly meaningful in an age of terrorism.  The worst forms of 
terrorist activity, far from presenting an appropriate military excep-
tion to the criminal law paradigm, in fact fit comfortably within tradi-
tional notions of treason—treason that must be punished in accor-
dance with the provisions of Article III. 
Forgetting the law of treason, of course, is a luxury of stable socie-
ties.  For the most part, we are not plagued by enemy invasions or by 
violent internal insurrections.  When confronted with crisis, it thus 
becomes easy to overlook the Treason Clause or to dismiss it as a 
remnant of the age of the musket, with little relevance to the dangers 
of a modern nuclear world. 
The Treason Clause, however, is not the product of an age of 
peace and tranquility.  The revolutionary generation that enshrined it 
in our Constitution had just emerged from a tumultuous, bloody civil 
war that pitted neighbor against neighbor and brother against 
brother.  Over six years of land combat and naval operations had re-
sulted in thousands of deaths, and the maiming and mutilation of 
thousands more.  The overthrow of a government by force and vio-
lence was not a theoretical possibility, but the very outcome of the 
Revolution itself.  Shortly before the Constitutional Convention be-
gan, Shays’s Rebellion broke out in western Massachusetts, raising the 
question of whether state governments themselves were secure, much 
less the fledgling national government.  In short, the Framers lived in 
a world of instability, uncertainty, and chaos, fully aware that the secu-
rity of the state was always at risk in the designs of disloyal Americans 
at home and potential foreign enemies abroad.  The Framers none-
theless recognized that an even greater danger lay in permitting the 
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government to punish individuals as enemies of the state without sig-
nificant procedural protections.  It is this lesson that lies at the heart 
of Article III’s least-known provision, a provision that must inform any 
serious analysis of the enemy combatant problem. 
 
 
